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A  POPULAR  THEME  in discussions  of stabilization  policy is that inflation 
-wage  inflation,  in particular-is becoming  less responsive  to changes 
in unemployment  and to the forces  of aggregate  demand  in general.  The 
view  is that wages  today  respond  only slightly  to unemployment  and vary 
more closely with prices,  which in turn depend  most on cost variables. 
Since the cost variables  are essentially  prices (and wages are the most 
significant  single price), the system reduces  to a highly autoregressive 
model, with unemployment  or demand  seemingly  playing a minor and 
shrinking  role. 
The government-engineered  recession  applied  to cure  inflation  in 1969- 
70 was  judged  to be a failure.  This  judgment  has led many  economists  to 
argue  that monetary  and fiscal  policy  simply  takes  too long to slow infla- 
tion; and the 1973-74  slowdown  and the sharper  1974-75 decline  seem 
to reinforce  these  views. Some never  believed  that recessions  significantly 
slowed  inflation;  others  lost their  faith  in them after  the late 1950s.  Since 
the social costs presumably  become  larger  the smaller  the adjustment  of 
wages  to unemployment  and to aggregate  demand  in general,  the issue of 
"changing  responsiveness"  has become  a central  concern  to policymakers 
and is the focus of this paper. 
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Table 1. Wage Coefficients  of the Official Unemployment  Rate and the 
Nonfarm  Deflator, Various Periods, Beginning 1954:1 
Inverse  of the  Percentage 
official  unemployment change  in 
rate  prices 
Period  U-'  pt-l 
1954:  1-1965:4  3.9980  0.0627 
-1968:4  4.9608  0.0650 
-1969:4  5.2399  0.1058 
-1971:4  2.6064  0.4884 
-1973:4  2.1896  0.4371 
-1975:2  2.3308  0.4414 
Source: Derived from equation wvt  ao +  al Ut-1  +  a2h  t-l,  where i,t  =  quarterly percentage  change 
in the average hourly earnings index of private nonsupervisory workers, adjusted for overtime in manu- 
facturing and interindustry  shifts;  U-1  = inverse of the official unemployment rate; and  't-1  =  quarterly 
percentage  change in the nonfarm deflator, lagged one quarter. 
My results  run counter  to the popular  theme:  in particular,  I find that 
the influence  of unemployment  is greater  today than it was in the 1950s. 
More  specifically,  the coefficient  in the wage  equation  on the labor-market 
variable,  UGAP  (which  I describe  below),  has increased  over  the post-1954 
period. Not only is there more wage inflation,  ceteris  paribus,  for any 
given  level  of labor-market  tightness,  but  also  the  Phillips  curve  has  become 
steeper  and  not flatter.  To be sure,  wage-inflation  rates  are  still  quite  sticky 
since  the estimated  distributed  lags are  long. 
A broad  range  of wage  equations  reveals  the growing  cyclical  responsive- 
ness of wage  inflation.  Quasi-reduced-form  wage  equations,  which  include 
both UGAP and  the percentage  change  in the money  supply,  explain  wage 
inflation  as well as models with autoregressive  price and wage terms. 
Both  have  coefficients  on UGAP that  increase  through  time.  The statistical 
success  of the growth  in the money supply  as a variable  substituting  for 
prices  provides  evidence  on the importance  of aggregate  demand  in general 
and suggests  that lagged  prices  in the structural  wage  equation  should  be 
interpreted  as a distributed-lag  generator  of past demand  effects.  My re- 
sults also indicate  that, if the full-employment  unemployment  rate was 
between  4 and 4.5 percent  during  the 1950s,  then it is approximately  5.5 
percent  today.  Thus,  I find  that the normalized  full-employment  rate  (de- 
noted UN)  is higher and that deviations  from that rate have a heavier 
impact  on inflation  today  than  twenty  years  ago. In this paper,  I make  no 
attempt  to find a new and more stable  Phillips  curve.  Indeed,  the coeffi- 
cients  of the wage  equations  are assumed  to change  over time. Michael L.  Wachter  117 
The results  present  intermediate-run  danger  signals for expansionary 
policy. In the near term there need be little concern  for inflation,  since 
unemployment  is so high. If the full-employment  unemployment  rate is 
near  5.5 percent,  however,  it is higher  than  the perceived  full-employment 
point that dominates  current  political  debates.  Since the parameters  on 
the demand  variables  are larger  today than in earlier  periods,  a recovery 
in which  unemployment  falls into the excess-demand  zone, and in which, 
because  of their  lag, prices  have  had  little  time  to adjust  downward,  should 
lead to the highest  ongoing  inflation  rate  in the postwar  period.  Over  the 
near  term,  however,  the larger  parameters  on the demand  variables  imply 
that  progress  can  be made  in moderating  inflation.  Within  a few years,  the 
inflation  rate can be reduced  if society  is willing  to pay the cost of high 
unemployment.  However,  the high level of the full-employment  unem- 
ployment  rate strongly  suggests  a need to implement  structural  measures 
to reduce  UN  as a complement  to an  expansionary  aggregate-demand  policy. 
The Case for Increasing  Rigidity 
Although  there  has been little work that directly  investigates  the issue 
of changing  responsiveness,  some available  evidence  appears  to support 
the view that the Phillips  curve  has become  less steep. For example,  esti- 
mates of a simplified  Phillips  curve  equation,  shown in table 1, indicate 
that  the coefficient  on U-1  (the reciprocal  of the unemployment  rate)  drops 
by more  than  50 percent  between  1969  and 1975.  Hence,  the Phillips  curve 
evolves  into a practically  horizontal  line. At the same  time, the coefficient 
on price inflation  increases  just as dramatically  and as persistently.  Al- 
though  the Phillips  curve of table 1 is a straw  man when compared  with 
the complicated  specifications  in the literature,  a cataloguing  of those 
various  equations  would yield essentially  this conclusion  with respect  to 
the relevant  coefficients.  Unfortunately,  direct  comparisons  across  equa- 
tions are not possible because of differences  in the specification  of the 
relationship. 
These observations  have led some to adopt the view that the wage 
system  is driven  increasingly  by prices  rather  than  by demand  pressures  in 
the labor market.  Making  matters  worse, the price equation  has almost 
uniformly  been estimated  to follow costs, but not demand  pressures,  in 
the goods markets.  The cost arguments  in the price function,  however, 118  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Table 2.  Change  in Compensation  per Manhour  in the Private Nonfarm 
Economy,  Four Quarters  before and after Cyclical Peaks, 1948-73 
Change  in 
compensation  Difference( 
per manhourb  (percentage 
Period  Cyclical  peaka  (percent)  points) 
Before  peak  1948:4  8.0 
After peak  0.4 
Difference  -7.6 
Before  peak  1953:2  6.0 
After peak  3.3 
Difference  -2.7 
Before  peak  1957:3  5.4 
After peak  3.8 
Difference  -1.6 
Before  peak  1960:2  4.3 
After peak  3.0 
Difference  -1.3 
Before  peak  1969:4  6.7 
After peakd  7.4 
Difference  0.7 
Before  peak  1973:4  8.0p 
After peak  9.7p 
Difference  1.7p 
Source: Economic  Report  of the President,  February  1975, together with the Annual  Report  of the Council 
of Economic  Advisers,  p. 140. 
a.  Quarter  designated as cyclical peak by National Bureau of Econoomic  Research. 
b. Four-quarter  rate of change; all persons. 
c.  All differences, except as noted, are changes four quarters after peak minus changes four quarters 
before peak. 
d. Change from 1969:4 to average of 1970:4 and 1971  :1 to smooth effect of auto strike. 
p  Prelinminary. 
are  simply  other  prices,  such  as those  of capital,  labor  (the wage  rate),  and 
raw  materials.' 
What  emerges  in this  context  is an autoregressive  system  in which  wages 
(and  prices)  follow some combination  of their  own lagged  values.  For my 
1. See the review article by William  D. Nordhaus, "Recent Developments  in Price 
Dynamics,"  in Otto Eckstein, ed., The Econometrics  of Price Determination,  A Con- 
ference  Sponsored  by the Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System and the 
Social Science Research Council (Board of Governors, 1972), and George de Menil, 
"Aggregate  Price Dynamics,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 56 (May 1974), 
pp. 129-40. That demand  variables  may be important-even in a cost-driven  price  equa- 
tion-is  shown by Robert J. Gordon, "The Impact of Aggregate  Demand on Prices," 
BPEA, 3:1975, pp. 613-70. If one adopts the methodology  that I use here in the wage 
equation,  one would almost certainly  find a much greater  role for demand  pressures  in 
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purposes  it is not important  whether  wages are determined  by lagged 
wages or lagged prices or some combination  of the two. Any of these 
relations  is an essentially  autoregressive  form  in which  demand  forces  are 
absent or have little effect. In the extreme,  these models are akin to a 
natural-rate theory of wage inflation. Wages are exogenous in that they 
are determined  in an autoregressive  model. Rather than being vertical, 
the Phillips  curve  is horizontal.2 
A second piece of evidence  is found by analyzing  changes  in wages 
from the peak to the trough of business  cycles. Appearing  in the 1975 
Annual  Report  of the Council  of Economic  Advisers  were  the data  shown 
in table  2, which  indicate  that the deceleration  in wage inflation  immedi- 
ately  before  and after  peaks  has been dampened  considerably  since 1945. 
For example,  the rise  in compensation  per  manhour  slowed  7.6 percentage 
points  between  the 1948  peak (when  the rate was 8.0 percent)  and a year 
later (0.4 percent).  By the 1960 downturn  the wage deceleration  around 
the  peak  was  only 1.3  points  and  after  the 1969  peak,  wage  inflation  actually 
accelerated.  In an excellent  study  of price  changes  over  the business  cycle, 
Philip Cagan  presents  a detailed  analysis  of price responsiveness  going 
back  to cyclical  swings  during  the 1920s.  Here  again,  the evidence  appears 
to suggest  that prices have responded  less to excess supply in postwar 
recessions  than  in prewar  ones and similarly  less in the more recent  post- 
war  recessions  than in the earlier  postwar  experiences.3 
2. The view that the wage-price  or wage-wage  process  can proceed  with little or no 
impact from demand  factors has surfaced  regularly  during  the discussions  of inflation 
at the Brookings  panel  meetings.  See, for example,  "General  Discussion"  (of papers  by 
Barry  Bosworth  and Robert J. Gordon),  BPEA, 2:1972, pp. 426-30. A more moderate 
stance, but one still stressing  the weakness of demand factors, is taken in Arthur M. 
Okun, "Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs," BPEA, 2:1975, pp.  369-72; 
William  D. Nordhaus,  "Inflation  Theory  and Policy," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 
66 (May 1976), pp. 59-64; and U.S.  Congressional  Budget Office, "Recovery: How 
Fast and How Far" (Government  Printing  Office,  1975; processed).  One of the earliest 
post-Keynesian  models in which changes in wage inflation are not, and never were, 
caused by aggregate  demand can be found in Sidney Weintraub,  Al  Approach  to the 
Theory  of Income  Distribution  (Chilton, 1958). 
3. Phillip  Cagan,  The  Hydra-Headed  Monster:  Thze  Problem  of Inflation  in the United 
States (American  Enterprise  Institute, 1974). Cagan concludes that "the dampened 
response  appears  to reflect ...  a strengthened,  general  belief that inflationary  move- 
ments  will not be subdued  quickly"  (p. 48). This, he argues,  is due in turn  to the govern- 
ment's commitment  to full employment  unconstrained  by gold-reserve  requirements. 
See also his "Changes  in the Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices in the 1920's 
and  Post-World  War  II,"  Explorations  in Economic  Research,  vol.  2  (Winter  1975), 
pp. 54-104. The Cagan discussion is not couched in the Phillips-curve  terminology, 
and he appears  to be discussing  aggregate  demand  in general. 120  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
General  Background 
The issue of the increasing responsiveness of wages involves four ele- 
ments: the problem of differentiating movements along a Phillips curve 
from shifts in the curve, the interpretation of predetermined variables in 
the wage equation, the dating of cyclical turning points for wage inflation, 
and the definition of the proper unemployment variable. In order to elabo- 
rate on these points, I first sketch out the underlying wage model to be 
tested and then explore briefly the basis of wage rigidity. 
THE WAGE  EQUATION 
The basic wage equation, excluding for the moment the question of the 
variation over time in the slope of the Phillips curve, is of the form 
(1)  Wi't  =  ao +  E f  3UGAP ti  +  yIp  yt-i  +  El, 
i=O  i=l 
where wi  is the percentage rate of change of wages, UGAP is some measure 
of labor-market tightness (to be defined below), and p3  is the percentage 
rate of change of prices. The error term, El, is assumed to be serially un- 
correlated and normally distributed. The distributed lags are important 
because the firm's labor market is, in general, not an auction market that 
adjusts to daily spot wages. Rather, as discussed below, the firm is best 
viewed as  adopting a  wage  strategy (for  example,  a  fixed schedule of 
future wage increases) for some planning period. The clearest case of this 
concept is the multiyear union contract. 
In the traditional Phillips-curve equation, lags are included on the price 
term but not on the unemployment term. This is an unnecessarily restric- 
tive assumption since the fixed-wage  contract makes conditions in the labor 
market at t-  i relevant to wage changes contracted in the current period, t. 
More generally, then, lags should be included on both p  and  UGAP to 
represent an amalgam of expectational and adjustment effects. 
In  analyzing the responsiveness of  wage inflation to  unemployment, 
attention is usually focused on 300,  the current coefficient of UGAP.  Adding 
a distributed lag on  UGAP makes it clear that the direct effect of unem- 
ployment on wages should include the full term ioi. 
Besides the direct effect, loi,  unemployment, or UGAP, also has an in- Michael  L. Wachter  121 
direct effect on iw through the price equation. Most price equations are 
written as a cost markup with demand playing a small role. A fairly general 
price equation is of the form 
(2)  fit  =  0 +  0C16  +02(V-4)  +  q3D+  E2, 
where e is a vector of cost variables, excluding wages, q is the percentage 
rate of change of long-run productivity, and D is a demand variable, such 
as capacity utilization. 
Even if one assumes that  p3 is small or close to zero, equation 2 indi- 
cates an indirect effect of unemployment on wage inflation. Specifically, if 
equations 1 and 2 are solved for a reduced-form equation, what results is 
an indirect or feedback effect through the influence of iw  on p.4  Indeed, the 
feedback effect indicates that the wage equation can be written as a func- 
tion of an infinite lagged time series of the unemployment rate. Interpreted 
in this manner, the price term in the structural wage equation acts as a 
distributed-lag  generator for the independent variable UGAP.5 
Consequently, identifying short- and long-run responses is central to the 
question of  the responsiveness of  wage inflation to  aggregate demand. 
The term 10i (and not just the initial coefficient, 3oo)  measures the short-run 
or direct effect. The feedback response of demand variables through the 
price mechanism represents the long-run or indirect effect. The reduced- 
form specification, in which wv  is a function of UGAP with an infinite lag, 
makes it clear that the point at which the direct unemployment lag ends 
and the indirect effect begins is a matter of definition. 
To test for the changing responsiveness of wage inflation to unemploy- 
ment or to  aggregate demand in general, the parameters of equation  1 
are allowed to vary over time, r. In general form, the wage equation may 
be written as 
m  n 
(3)  Wt-=  ao()  +  E  3(Tr)UGAP  t-  +  E  -Yi(r)pt-i +  El. 
i=O  i=1 
4. In the long run, if the Phillips  curve is vertical,  the structural  wage-price-unem- 
ployment equations  cannot be solved to yield a quasi-reduced-form  wage equation. 
The fact that wages  and unemployment  are always  observed  in short-run  disequilibrium 
allows estimation  of the Phillips  relationship. 
5. If the autoregressive  term is viewed as a distributed-lag  generator  for the labor- 
market  term, then it makes less difference  whether UGAP  is entered  with or without 
a lag. Placing  a lag on UGAP,  in combination  with one on p, only increases  the flexi- 
bility of the lag structure  that links w to lagged aggregate-demand  effects. This point 
appears  in the empirical  results  below. 122  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
Specifically,  for estimation  purposes,  I adopt  the assumption  that changes 
in parameters  have  proceeded  monotonically  (following  a trend). 
Besides  estimating  equation  3, estimating  a quasi-reduced-form  wage 
model  is useful.  Specifically,  I replace  the lagged  autoregressive  price  term 
with  changes  in the  money  supply.  I call  it a "quasi-reduced  form"  because 
the unemployment  term  remains  in the equation.  Although  the structural 
price  equation  may be approached  as a function  of costs, these costs are 
eventually  dependent  upon  the money  supply  in almost  all standard  macro 
models  (regardless  of the exact  mechanism).6  Including  changing  param- 
eter  values,  one can estimate  a model of the form 
mn 
(5)  =  ao(T)  +  ,  3(&r)UGAPti  +  E  X)i(r)itizt +  E3, 
where  im  is the percentage  change  in the money  supply.  This approach  is 
compatible  with a range of structural  models in which the UGAP  term 
describes  the dynamic  short-run  path of the inflation  process  and  mh  deter- 
mines  the long-run  equilibrium  rate of inflation.  Estimating  equation  5 as 
well as 3 is useful because  the autoregressive  elements  in the latter can 
obscure  the relationship  between  wages and unemployment  or demand 
variables  in general.  Lagged  wages  or prices  on the right  side of the equa- 
tion may indicate  the presence  of a lagged  response  of current  wages to 
unemployment.  Alternatively,  lagged  wages  or prices  may  be "exogenous" 
in the sense  that they cannot  be explained  by economic  variables  such as 
unemployment  arising  from  weak aggregate  demand. 
The resulting  equations  are meant to be descriptive  in the sense that 
they  tell  the  story  of the  postwar  period.  They  are  not developed  as forecast- 
ing equations  because  the time parameters  should  not be simply  extrapo- 
lated into the future.  Indeed,  the parameter  values estimated  for UGAP 
and  p3  (or m1)  reflect  the particular  historical  dynamic  time path of those 
6. The mechanism  through  which the money supply affects wage inflation  must be 
approached  through a simultaneous-equation  system. Equation 3 is compatible  with 
almost all competing  views of the channels  through  which changes in money influence 
inflation. For example, monetary factors may work directly through the expectation 
equation, 
(4)  e=f  P_}  m_}) 
where  pe  is the expected  rate of price change, {jti}  is a vector of past price changes, 
and 1t'i-i} is a vector of past changes  in the money supply. The importance  of intro- 
ducing  policy variables  in the expectational  equation  is stressed  by Robert E. Lucas,  Jr., 
"Econometric  Testing  of the Natural  Rate Hypothesis,"  in Eckstein,  ed., Econometrics 
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variables. For  example, the  statistical importance of  prices relative to 
unemployment over any data set depends upon the character of cyclical 
fluctations. If unemployment moves back and forth across the noninfla- 
tionary rate, but never too  far in either direction (perhaps because the 
government pursues a dampened stop-go policy), then the unemployment 
term will be statistically most significant because the observations will be 
around a narrow band of Phillips curves. Indeed, any p term may well be 
insignificant due to a lack of independent variation. 
THE CAUSES OF WAGE INSENSITWITY 
In a noncyclical setting, wage rigidity has two components: one origi- 
nates from firms-the  wage offered; the other from workers-the  reserva- 
tion wage. Since I have discussed my own position on the wage-rigidity 
question elsewhere, and since Okun and Hall7 have advanced or extended 
the general  type of model significantly  in a recent issue of Brookings  Papers, 
I will deal with the topic only briefly here. 
Firms pay a wage premium for their work force for a variety of reasons, 
which arise from two types of phenomena. The first is the presence of 
unions and oligopolies. Unions desire a wage premium as an end in itself 
whereas oligopolies use it to assure a labor supply and, in particular, a 
queue of workers for periods of demand expansion.8 The second, inter- 
related, phenomenon is the desire of  firms for an ongoing relationship 
with  their workforce, especially where the job  content  is  idiosyncratic 
and involves considerable job-specific training.9 As a consequence, most 
jobs  in these high-wage firms do not have a  direct demand-and-supply 
component. Rather, they are part of the internal labor market of the firm 
in which jobs are connected through a series of promotion ladders with 
7. Okun, "Inflation:  Its Mechanics  and Welfare  Costs," and Robert E. Hall, "The 
Rigidity of Wages  and the Persistence  of Unemployment,"  BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 301-35. 
8. Stephen  A. Ross and Michael  L. Wachter,  "Wage Determination,  Inflation,  and 
the Industrial  Structure,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 63 (September  1973), pp. 
675-92. 
9. Arthur M. Okun, "Upward Mobility in  a  High-Pressure  Economy," BPEA, 
1:1973, pp. 207-52, and Oliver E. Williamson,  Michael L. Wachter, and Jeffrey E. 
Harris, "Understanding  the Employment  Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic  Ex- 
change," Bell Jourrnal  of Economics,  vol.  6 (Spring 1975), pp. 250-78. The seminal 
study on specific  training  is Gary S. Becker,  Human  Capital:  A Theoretical  and  Empiri- 
cal Analysis,  with Special Reference  to Education  (Columbia University  Press for the 
National Bureau  of Economic  Research, 1964). 124  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
their own rules to provide enforcement and information. Wages on each 
job  are set as part of  the internal wage structure of  the firm, with no 
direct influence from the general market. Promotions and skill training 
that are rewarded by the internal wage structure mean that the oppor- 
tunity wage of  workers is below their current wage, thus discouraging 
mobility. Firms are reluctant to try to capture the discrepancy, lest they 
encourage costly mobility of trained workers and discourage workers from 
acquiring  the knowledge (both specific and general) needed to move along 
the promotion ladder. 
Although certain labor markets lack virtually any internal structure 
and hence adjust to demand pressures immediately, most have some struc- 
ture. Consequently, the continuously clearing sector of a two-sector model, 
though a useful expositional device, is unlikely to represent any important 
part of the labor market. The differences among labor markets lie, rather, 
in degree-in  the length of reaction lags. Essentially, if one could calculate 
the wage premium that industries pay above the opportunity or competi- 
tive wage, they could be ranked along a wage-rigidity spectrum. It is this 
feature-the  wage premium-that  gives firms their ability to ignore short- 
run market forces.10  Hence, it is the wage premium at the firm level that 
translates into "insensitive" wage-inflation rates at the macro level. 
In this model, wage premiums and the consequent wage rigidity arise 
from long-run institutional commitments that are not responsive to short- 
run economic stimuli. In the neoclassical terminology, wage rigidity and 
deviations of unemployment from the noninflationary rate still result from 
"fooling," in some definitional sense. However, the problem is not that 
rational firms and workers try to  guess present and near-term nominal 
and real wages. Rather, the problem is that firms and workers  cannot have 
all of the necessary information  on the  future states of the world, including 
fluctuations in aggregate demand, when they establish their contractual 
and institutional arrangements. This model is still rational, but only after 
complete recontracting occurs. 
In this context, the responsiveness of wages can change for a variety of 
reasons. One might be  a  general increase in the number of  "customer 
markets" to use Okun's terminology, of internal labor markets, and the 
10. "Wage premium"  has two definitions:  (1) If workers  in a firm's  current  work- 
force receive  some compensation  for their specific  training,  their current  wage is above 
their opportunity  wage and includes  a wage premium.  In this definition,  all firms  may 
pay a wage premium,  at any given time. (2) In external  hiring, firms  that offer a new 
worker with no specific training a wage (or prospective  discounted  lifetime earnings 
stream)  above the competitive  wage are paying  a wage premium. Michael L.  Wachter  125 
like, resulting from the increasing complexity of economic relationships; 
another might be a shift of employment toward industries with relatively 
well-developed internal markets. The first factor is difficult to  evaluate. 
Although one might expect economic growth to encourage the spread of 
well-developed internal  labor markets, there is no clear evidence that labor 
markets have become more complex over the short period since the 1950s 
during which the hypothesized recession-proof inflation developed.11  As to 
the second factor, relatively dramatic  employment shifts have indeed taken 
place, especially toward services and the government sector. Although an 
important component of the former sector lies at the auction-market end 
of the spectrum and accounts for the expanding employment of the young 
and, especially, of women, the government sector is way at the other end. 
On balance, there is no obvious trend in one direction or the other. 
Central to  the argument of  this paper, however, is that institutional 
arrangements  can also have an impact on wage insensitivity if the institu- 
tions themselves respond to inflation. Cost-of-living escalators are an ex- 
ample of just such an institutional change. More generally, as inflation 
accelerates-in  particular, if uncertainty surrounding future inflation rates 
deepens at the same time-devices  that enable institutions to respond more 
rapidly to changing economic conditions are apt to appear. Indeed, I argue 
that it is this factor that accounts for the increasing sensitivity of wage 
inflation to aggregate-demand  pressures; that is, although wage rigidity is 
a natural  result of contractual arrangements,  its degree, and the very nature 
of these arrangements, will depend upon the degree of uncertainty sur- 
rounding economic conditions. This type of institutional change will evolve 
slowly. The costs associated with introducing  new contractual terms assume 
a long-lagged response (at least for the level  of  inflation rates that the 
United States has experienced to date). Hence, over time, the greater the 
uncertainty  concerning the course of future nominal wage rates, the greater 
the responsiveness of iw  to  UGAP. 
The Normalized Unemployment  Rate 
In calculating the changing responsiveness of wages to unemployment, 
a central problem is to normalize the unemployment rate so that a given 
11. For a different  view, see Nordhaus,  "Inflation  Theory  and Policy."  Nordhaus  as- 
sumes  that customer  markets  have become  more  important  and states  that "the  dilemma 
for policymakers  in choosing  between  inflation  and output  is not only cruel  but becom- 
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level of the normalized variable denotes the same extent of excess demand 
(or supply) at any point in time. A number of attempts have been made to 
adjust for the changing relationship between unemployment and labor- 
market tightness; the most widely accepted adjustment  has been developed 
by Perry."2  Alternatively, a number of econometric models utilize the un- 
employment rate for prime-age males (Upm) as the best indicator of labor- 
market conditions. The variable that I construct is essentially a transfor- 
mation of  Upm into  an excess-demand variable based  on  measured un- 
employment, denoted UGAP: 
UGAP  =  (UN/U)c, 
where UN is the normalized rate of  unemployment,  U is the measured 
unemployment rate, and c is a scale constant. The constant c is set equal 
to 0.25. This gives UGAP a scale similar to that of the reciprocal of mea- 
sured U and Perry  unemployment and eases comparisons among these vari- 
ables. Besides being closely correlated with U,  by construction, the UGAP 
series is also similar to the Perry adjustment in terms of its empirical varia- 
tion. The theoretical underpinnings of the two, however, are different. In 
a later section, the hypothesis of the changing responsiveness of wages to 
labor-market tightness is tested using UGAP, Perry unemployment, and 
upm. 
The  UN series, which is calculated below, may be viewed in two ways. 
In its most  general form it simply represents the weighting factor that 
adjusts measured unemployment so that  UGAP denotes the same labor- 
market tightness over time. Under this approach, no significance attaches 
to the point where UN =  U. Alternatively, by accepting a specific value for 
the full-employment unemployment rate of prime-age males, one can inter- 
pret UN as a specific full-employment unemployment rate and not just as 
a weighting factor. The advantage of the latter approach is that for the 
crucial policy variable-the  measured unemployment rate-it  provides an 
explicit (if approximate) measure of slack in the economy at any point 
in time. 
Unfortunately, few of  the variables that are likely to  affect the nor- 
malized unemployment rate can be easily quantified with the precision 
needed to estimate their impact on it. A full treatment of the subject and 
12. George L. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets and Inflation," BPEA, 3:1970, 
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of the difficulties  of measurement  and  estimation  requires  a separate  paper. 
Hence the UN measure  of this paper  is a crude  proxy."3 
Perhaps  the most significant  factor in changes  in UN  is the alteration 
in the age-sex  composition  of the labor  force.  Perry-and, more recently, 
R. A. Gordon,  and Holt and his associates-have studied  the importance 
of these  demographic  shifts.  They  have  indicated  that  age-sex  demographic 
shifts in the labor  force  heavily  outweigh  industrial,  occupational,  or geo- 
graphical  shifts  in affecting  the  impact  of any  given  level  of unemployment. 
Beginning  with  Perry,  the measured  unemployment  rate  has been replaced 
by a weighted  unemployment  rate  to reflect  this demographic  shift.14 
Second,  and closely  related  to the demographic  shift analyzed  by Perry, 
the very sharp  swing  in the population  and labor force toward younger 
workers,  especially  younger  women,  may have induced  a supply-demand 
imbalance  and  a resulting  relative  increase  in the unemployment  experience 
of entrants  into the labor  market."5 
According  to this hypothesis,  one can distinguish  older workers  with 
continuous  labor-market  attachment  from younger  workers  and workers 
with discontinuous  attachment  in terms of their specific  training.  These 
labor groups  become imperfect  substitutes  for one another  so that the 
relative  abundance  of one group should alter wage differentials.  If wage 
differentials  among  demographic  groups  are not sufficiently  flexible,  un- 
employment  rates  will change  as well (or instead).  In fact, in a world in 
which the labor requirements  for capital equipment  and the like are 
13. The UN equation  that I would have liked to estimate  is of the form 
(6)  UN  = g(A,  CU,  woa), 
where A is the age structure  of the population, Cu is the cost of being unemployed, 
and wa is the secular  dispersion  in the wage index. The discussion  in this paper does 
utilize A and, to a much lesser extent, C.. The w, variable  is omitted entirely. Data 
problems complicate  the measurement  of C. and wa,  as theoretical  problems do the 
definition  of the proper  independent  variables.  Attention  must  also focus on the relation- 
ship between the level of  UGAP in the labor market and unutiized capacity in the 
goods market. 
14. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets"; R.  A.  Gordon, "Some Macroeconomic 
Aspects of Manpower  Policy," in Lloyd Ulman, ed., Manpower  Programs  in the  Policy 
Mix (Johns Hopkins University  Press, 1973); and Charles  C. Holt and others, "Man- 
power Policies to Reduce  Inflation  and Unemployment,"  in ibid. 
15. This type of "long  swings"  model is developed  most fully  by Richard  A. Easterlin, 
Population,  Labor  Force,  and  Long  Swings  in Economic  Growth:  The  American  Experience 
(Columbia University  Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968). 
See also  Michael L.  Wachter, "A Labor Supply Model for Secondary Workers," 
Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  vol. 54 (May 1972),  pp. 141-51. 128  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
largely  fixed, it may be difficult  for relative  wages to clear the market. 
And since  young workers  have a tendency  to age over time, firms  must 
anticipate  demographic  swings  in the labor force. Of special  importance 
in preventing  relative  wages from adjusting,  and hence in thrusting  the 
adjustment  process  onto unemployment  rates,  however,  has been govern- 
ment  policy.  First,  the major  extension  of minimum  wages  has prevented 
adjustments  in demand  that would favor lower-skilled  workers.  Second, 
changes  in unemployment  compensation  and welfare  have steadily in- 
creased  the relative reservation  price of labor, thereby  lowering  the cost 
of being  unemployed. 
Unfortunately,  time series  on the various  transfer  payments  and mini- 
mum-wage  laws that encompass  both dollars  per claimant  and coverage 
are difficult  to construct.  Consequently,  for this paper  I cannot directly 
test the hypotheses-advanced  by Feldstein  and Ehrenberg  and Oaxaca 
for unemployment  compensation,  Mincer  and Welch  for minimum  wages, 
and Doeringer  and Piore  for welfare-that increases  in the benefits  avail- 
able  and especially  in the coverage  of these  programs  have increased  what 
I refer  to as UN."6 
The increase  in coverage  is of special  importance  since  it largely  affects 
the low-skilled  workers  who are disproportionately  involved  in cyclical 
unemployment  and  in the  high  turnover  rates  of the  young  and  of (married) 
females.  Reductions  in the cost of being  unemployed  facilitate  movements 
into and out of employment.  Whether  he is eligible  for certain  transfer 
payments  helps an individual  to choose between  being unemployed  and 
withdrawing  from  the labor force.  The literature  on unemployment  com- 
pensation,  minimum  wages,  and welfare,  although  not specifically  related 
to  UN,  finds a displacement  effect due to transfer  payments  that would 
have  raised  that rate significantly  since 1962. 
Thus,  the demographic  swing,  coupled  with  the decline  in the cost of un- 
employment,  has operated  to increase  UN  in two ways.  First,  these  factors 
have caused  a relative  increase  in the size of labor-force  groups  that his- 
torically  display high UN. Second, they have increased  structural  and 
16. Martin  S. Feldstein,  Lowering  the  Permanent  Rate of Uniemployment,  A Study  Pre- 
pared for the Joint Economic Committee,  93:1 (Government  Printing Office, 1973); 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg  and Ronald L. Oaxaca,  "Unemployment  Insurance,  Duration of 
Unemployment,  and Subsequent  Wage Gain" (Cornell  University,  August 1975; pro- 
cessed);  Jacob Mincer,  "Unemployment  Effects of Minimum  Wages"  (Columbia  Uni- 
versity,  September  1975; processed);  Finis Welch, "Minimum  Wage Legislation  in the 
United States,"  Economic  Inquiry,  vol. 12 (September  1974),  pp. 285-318; and Peter B. 
Doeringer  and Michael  J. Piore,  Internial  Labor  Markets  and  Manpower  Anialysis  (Heath, 
1971). Michael  L. Wachter  129 
frictional  unemployment  among secondary  workers,  thereby  pushing  up 
their  already  high Uv. Thus,  the labor  force  is growing  disproportionately 
in those  demographic  groups  that  have  high  and  rising  Uv, and this  means 
a rise  in the economy-wide  UN. 
A  basic maintained assumption in  calculating Uv is  that  UNPM,  the 
UN  of males  in the prime-age  group  from 25 to 54, is largely  unaffected 
by the labor-market  developments  that  have  altered  UN.  More  specifically, 
UNpm  is assumed  to be constant  at 2.9 percent.  The  justification  for the 
constant  level of UNPM  is that the relative  decline  in the cost of being 
unemployed  was due largely  to increases  in coverage  rates for minimum 
wages  and  unemployment  compensation  and benefit  levels  for public  assis- 
tance,  alterations  that  affected  prime-age  males  comparatively  little.  If they 
had an effect,  they  would  have  pushed  UNPM  up somewhat.  Offsetting  this 
factor,  however,  was  the growing  relative  scarcity  of this group  in the labor 
force  after 1962,  which  would  have operated  to decrease  UNPM.  As is well 
accepted,  a benchmark  or full-employment  value for any adjusted  unem- 
ployment  rate  is difficult  to calculate  with accuracy.  My argument  is that 
if the UN  for  prime-age  males  is the  most  stable,  it is best  to use  that  group's 
rate  for a fixed  benchmark  rate.  The 2.9 percent  figure  can be  justified  in a 
number  of ways. For example,  the work by Modigliani  and Papademos 
supports  this choice.'7  In the years that they identified  as close to the 
"noninflationary  rate of unemployment"  Up,m  averaged  3.03 percent;  only 
one had a  Up,, below 2.9 percent. Since 1954, Upm  has been below 2.9 
percent  during  1956:2-1957:2, 1965:2-1970:2,  and 1972:4-1974:3. 
A popular  technique  for uncovering  the noninflationary  unemployment 
rate  is to solve the Phillips  curve.  Using U,  as the labor-market  variable 
and estimating  an equation  of the form 
(7)  Wt =  ao +  E  fplUt_,  +  E 
i=O  ~~~i=4 
results  in  -yYi  >  1,  so that UNPM  is not defined.  To calculate  the  lag  structure 
on U,  one is forced  to constrain  1Yi =  1 and estimate  the equation  as a 
type of second difference  in which the dependent  variable  is the rate of 
wage  acceleration  or deceleration;  that is, 
n  m 
(7')  t -  57  t-i  =  to +  E  gi ut-i 
i-1  ieO 
The resulting  estimate  of UATPM is 3.2 Dercent. 
17. Franco Modigliani  and Lucas Papademos,  "Targets  for Monetary  Policy in the 
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Besides  requiring  that the wage equation  be perfectly  accelerationist- 
that is, that Dyj =  1-an  additional  problem  with this approach  is that 
the noninflationary  rate  is calculated  as the ratio of two parameters  from 
the statistical,  unstable  Phillips  curve.  These  considerations  limit the use- 
fulness  of a noninflationary  unemployment  rate or series  constructed  in 
this manner.'8 
Since the normalized  unemployment  rate is based on labor-market 
hypotheses  that are exogenous  to the Phillips curve, the  UN  concept 
adopted  here  should  be distinguished  from  the value  of the unemployment 
rate, determined  by the parameters  of the unstable  Phillips  curve,  which 
implies  a nonaccelerating  inflation  rate  at any given  point in time. 
The particular  value assigned  to UNPM has little effect  on the Phillips- 
curve  equations  estimated  in the next section.  Changing  this value would 
alter  the mean of UGAP,  but would do little to the variance  (around  the 
mean)  of the series,  or, as a consequence,  to the regression  results  of the 
next section.'9 
To calculate  UN  I first  estimated 
(8)  In (Uj) =  ao +  a, In (U,)  +  a2ln (RP,), 
where  U,  is the  unemployment  rate  among  prime-age  males,  25 to 54  years 
of age; Ui is the age-sex  unemployment  rate,  and RP, is the population  of 
individuals  16  to 24, relative  to the total population  of working  age.  20  The 
equation  estimates  for the period  1948-75  are presented  in table 3. 
18. The variance  of UNPM  is infinite  since it is the ratio of two normally  distributed 
variables.  The variance  can be approximated,  but this term is very large so that the 
confidence  interval around UNPM encompasses  values that are outside the observed 
range of any unemployment  rates. Hence, it is not possible to choose "conservative" 
values for UNPM  that lie within a standard  error  of the coefficient.  More generally,  the 
noninflationary  unemployment  rate is a statistic  that should be calculated  from a model 
that includes at least all of the equations  with feedbacks  among wage changes, price 
inflation,  and unemployment.  This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
19. Ross and Wachter,  "Wage Determination,"  discusses the possibility that UN 
may increase  as a function of the inflation  rate. If this is the case, the results of the 
following section still hold, but the implications for  stabilization policy are very 
different. 
20. The use of relative  population  rather  than relative  labor force as an explanatory 
variable  is based on the strong endogeneity  of the latter. Besides the effects of money 
illusion discussed earlier, Easterlin,  Population,  Labor Force, and Wachter, "Labor 
Supply  Model,"  argue  that real-wage  or standard-of-living  effects  may also be arguments 
in the labor-supply  model. These operate through relative population swings as the 
exogenous  variable.  Hence, in this framework  the RP, variable  is the correct  indepen- 
dent variable  that causes changes in labor-force participation  rates. In a structural 
version  of equation  8, the relative  wage term should be used in place of RP,. Michael L.  Wachter  131 
Table 3.  Results of Logarithmic  Regression  of Unemployment  Rates 
for Various Demographic  Groups  on Unemployment  Rate of Prime-Age 
Males and Ratio of Population  Aged 16-24 to Total Population 
of Working  Agea 
Population 
Prime-age  16-24 years 
male  of age relative 
unemployment  to total  Durbin- 
rate  population  Watson 
Sex and  Constant  Up.  RPy?  A2  statistic 
age group  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Male 
16-19  5.0547  0.6011  1.3670  0.7346  1.25 
(17.39)  (16.51)  (10.39) 
20-24  3.1200  0.9335  0.9354  0.8704  0.79 
(11.18)  (26.72)  (7.41) 
25-34  1.4517  1.0798  0.6150  0.9804  1.33 
(12.03)  (71.48)  (11.26) 
35-44  -0.3497  0.9969  -0.1090  0.9823  1.58 
(3.13)  (71.27)  (2.16) 
45-54  -1.4497  0.9142  -0.6515  0.9765  1.54 
(11.40)  (57.41)  (11.32) 
55-64  -1.3285  0.8218  -0.7110  0.9037  1.07 
(5.41)  (26.73)  (6.40) 
65 and over  0.4121  0.6375  -0.0775  0.7221  1.39 
(1.24)  (15.39)  (0.52) 
Female 
16-19  6.5012  0.3831  1.9038  0.4575  1.34 
(13.64)  (6.42)  (8.83) 
20-24  5.0420  0.5674  1.6089  0.6726  0.92 
(14.99)  (13.48)  (10.58) 
25-34  3.3319  0.5451  0.9668  0.6989  1.19 
(11.93)  (15.60)  (7.65) 
35-44  2.5699  0.5745  0.7586  0.7014  1.00 
(8.88)  (15.84)  (5.79) 
45-54  1.2669  0.5756  0.2747  0.7446  1.19 
(4.73)  (17.18)  (2.27) 
55-64  -0.2180  0.5374  -0.3512  0.6867  1.19 
(0.67)  (13.28)  (2.40) 
65 and over  3.1828  0.5452  1.1798  0.4375  1.46 
(6.45)  (8.83)  (5.29) 
Source: See text equation 8 for logarithmic  functional form. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 132  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
Assuming  that UNPM  is unchanged,  the estimated  values in columns 
2 and 3 lead to normalized  rates  for each of the Ui. The coefficient  for 
the population  aged 16 to 24 relative  to the total population  then indi- 
cates  the time-series  changes  in the UN  for each group  resulting  from  the 
demographic  imbalances  in the labor force.  Aggregating  the group UN  at 
each point in time using actual  labor-force  weights  results  in the overall 
UN  series depicted in figure 1.21 
Taking  RP,  as an indicator  of demographic  imbalance  for all groups 
in the labor  market  is not a strong  assumption.  Demographic  trends  being 
what  they  are,  a relative  increase  in young  people  in the population  implies 
quite directly  a decrease  in the relative  population  of older people. The 
equation  then identifies  which demographic  groups are substitutes  for 
younger  workers  (a2  in equation  8 > 0) and  which  groups  are  complements 
(a2  < 0). Essentially,  almost  all female  groups  and the young  male groups 
have a2>  0, while  the older  male groups  have  a2  <  0.22 
The UGAP  series  in its empirical  variation,  if not in its theoretical  under- 
pinning,  is similar  to that originally  calculated  by Perry.  To demonstrate 
the close relationships  among the various  unemployment  measures-the 
UGAP  construct,  the unemployment  rate  for prime-age  males  upon which 
it is based,  and the Perry-weighted  unemployment  measure,  Up-I  show 
their  simple  correlations  below.23 
UGAP  Upm  Up  w 
UGAP  1.0000 
Upm  0.9830  1.0000 
Up  0.9731  0.9776  1.0000 
wi  0.4678  0.3999  0.3224  1.0000 
21. The weighted average of the separate unemployment  rates calculated for men 
aged 25-34, 35-44, and 45-54, on the assumption of an overall rate for prime-age 
males of 2.9 percent,  may deviate from that assumed 2.9 figure. In principle,  an iter- 
ative procedure  could have been used to ensure consistency.  In practice,  the inconsis- 
tency was small enough to be safely ignored. 
22. A UN series was also constructed  by regressing  Ui on Upm  and the relative  popu- 
lation of each demographic  group. Still another  replaced  RP, with a time trend broken 
in 1962  (when  both demographic  shifts and major  increases  in transfer  payments  began 
to occur).  The results  were largely  unchanged. 
23. It is also reassuring  that most weighted  unemployment  measures  that are similar 
to the Perry unemployment  measure  also suggest that the current  noninflationary  un- 
employment  rate is approximately  5.5 percent.  See, for example,  Robert E. Hall, "The 
Process of Inflation in the Labor Market," BPEA, 2:1974, pp. 343-93; Modigliani 
and Papademos,  "Targets  for Monetary  Policy," and George E. Johnson, "The Deter- 
mination  of Wages  in the Union and Nonunion Sectors"  (University  of Michigan,  1975; 
processed).  The UGAP series, however, starts at a lower level and thus hlas  climbed 
mnore  rapidly  during  the 1960s  and 1970s  than has weighted  unemployment. 0  *0  ci 
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The Aggregate Phillips Curve, 1954:1-1975:2 
In testing  for the changing  responsiveness  of wages,  both structural  and 
reduced-form  wage equations  are estimated.  The relevant  equations  are 
3 and 5 given above. To test for shifts in the slope of UGAP, a cross- 
product  between  UGAP and the log of time (UGAP * LT) is added.  The 
type of time trend  to be included  is arbitrary  in that no theory  identifies 
a preferable  one. The form adopted  here is a log function  that begins 
arbitrarily  in 1945 and thus has an initial value of 4.92 (1954:  1) and a 
final value of 5.40 (1975:2). In fact, the log values over this range are 
close  to a linear  trend  and  a check  of a few  equations  indicates  no substan- 
tive difference  in results  between  the alternative  forms.  Including  the trend, 
equation  3, for example,  can be rewritten  as 
m  m  n 
(9)  iWt =  ao +  E  fjUGAPt_i  +  3  j(UGAPt_i  *  LTt-i)  +  >2 -it-., 
i=O  i=O  i=l 
where  the term UGAP  *  LT  introduces  the maintained  hypothesis  that the 
coefficient  on UGAP  has  changed  monotonically  over  the  estimation  period 
(following  the log trend).  In this form,  the total direct  effect  of UGAP  on 
w can be calculated  from 
m  m 
5D  /i3 +  E  6iLTi. 
The  choice  of the period  for  most  of the equations,  1954:  1 through  1975:2, 
was dictated  by the need for lagged observations  on the independent 
variables. 
As outlined  above,  any variant  of equation  3 or 5 must have at least 
two components:  a variable  reflecting  the tightness  of labor markets  is 
needed to measure  movements  along a Phillips  curve, while the second 
component  is needed  to set the height of the Phillips  curve.  As stressed 
above,  given  the interaction  between  excess  demand  and  inertia  or expecta- 
tion variables,  no set of independent  variables  can neatly  divide  the two; 
indeed,  the second  is essentially  the long-lagged  effect  of the first.  Conse- 
quently,  the coefficient  of one term  will depend  upon the specification  of 
the other. 
The wage equations,  or Phillips  curves,  estimated  here are, by hypoth- 
esis, assumed  to have unstable  parameters.  Since these coefficients  are 
time variant,  the fitted  equations  are designed  to describe  the estimation Michael L.  Wachter  135 
Table 4.  Wage Coefficients  of UGAP and the Nonfarm Deflator, Various 




a,  prices  a, 
Period  UGAP  p t-l  I-a2 
1954:1-1965:4  2.6689  0.1486  3.13 
-1968:4  3.1126  0.1363  3.60 
-1969:4  3.3106  0.1517  3.90 
-1971:4  2.4692  0.4115  4.20 
-1973:4  2.9981  0.3045  4.31 
-1975:2  2.7292  0.3946  4.51 
Source: Derived from equation wvt  =  a0  +  alUGAPt  +  a2jt.1,  where UGAP  =  (UN/U) times 0.25; 
U is the official unemployment  rate, and UN is the normalized unemployment rate series given in figure 1; 
the definitions of the other sylmibols  are as in table 1. 
period. In general, I relied on the R2, t-statistic for individual coefficients, 
and F test for groupings of variables to choose the equations that tell the 
best story of the past two decades. Ability to predict the future is ignored, 
not only because all of the available observations are used in the estima- 
tion period, but also because of  uncertainty about specifying the time- 
varying coefficients that guide the unstable tradeoff through time. 
SEQUENTIAL  ESTIMATES  OF A  SIMPLE PHILLIPS CURVE 
The first test of changing responsiveness is to reestimate the equation of 
table 1, replacing official unemployment with UGAP. This substitution in- 
dicates how much of the decline in the slope of that Phillips curve is due 
simply to the inability of the official unemployment rate to reflect labor- 
market conditions because the nature of unemployment has changed. The 
results show that the decline in the slope of the Phillips curve, indicated 
by the changes in the coefficient a,, disappears when UGAP replaces U- 
(see table 4). In contrast with the sharp decline in the coefficient on U-1 in 
table  1 after  1970, the  coefficient on  UGAP is  mostly  stable over this 
period.24  Hence, failure  to take account of the changing nature of unem- 
24. In more complicated  equations  with several  price variables  and constructs  such 
as "hidden  unemployment,"  it seems to make less difference  whether UGAP or U is 
used. The reason is that the UGAP and UN effects are partially absorbed  into these 
additional  labor-market  and autoregressive  terms.  See, for example,  Robert J. Gordon, 
"Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve,"  BPEA, 2:1972, pp. 385-421. 
The additional  variables  in these more complicated  structural  equations,  however,  are 
themselves  often constructed  from the basic variables  that appear  in equations  3 and 5. 136  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
ployment can lead to the presumption that wage inflation responds less to 
excess-demand pressures today than in the past. The tilt in the Phillips 
curve toward the horizontal disappears when the unemployment variable 
is adjusted for changes in UN. 
Analysis of the increasing values of the price term in table 4 suggests an 
even stronger conclusion. The feedback effect grows in importance and it 
contributes to the long-run or total influence of UGAP on wage inflation. 
That total effect is given by the formula all(1  -  a2)  which has been growing 
continuously since 1965, as the last column of table 4 demonstrates. 
THE UGAP COEFFICIENT:  CHANGES OVER TIME 
Next,  I  shall estimate a number of  alternative Phillips curves to  test 
directly for a changing coefficient on UGAP. The purpose is not to locate 
the best fit, but rather to  indicate the robustness of the finding on the 
changing slope of the Phillips curve. In all cases, the coefficients on UGAP 
and  UGAP * LT indicate an increasing slope for the Phillips curve over 
the  years  1954-75.  Since the  intercept is  held  constant, the  increasing 
coefficient on UGAP not only increases the slope of the Phillips curve but 
also pivots the curve outward.25 
Equation 5.1 in table 5 improves on the equations of table 4 by adding 
the cross-product UGAP * LT but omitting any lags. Even from this simple 
form the basic finding emerges: the Phillips curve is getting steeper. In 
this and in all other equations, the negative sign on UGAP does not indi- 
cate a perverse slope for the Phillips curve. That negative value serves as 
a  constant drag on  the  size of  the combined or full  UGAP coefficient. 
Since LT increases with time, the positive sign on UGAP * LT means that 
the  full  coefficient is  growing.  In  addition,  the  combined  coefficient, 
2/3i +  Z2ysLT, is  always positive  within the  estimation period;  that  is, 
even when LT is at its lowest value,  yALT  >  10j. The t-statistics on UGAP 
and  UGAP * LT in table 5 relate to  the statistical significance of  intro- 
ducing the respective terms, and their size is related only indirectly to the 
important matter of the significance of the combined coefficient. The stan- 
dard error of the full coefficient is given by 
Vofgn +  Lf2a  +  2LThzp;z7- 
25. An 'attempt  to  separate empirically  these two factors-the  outward shift of 
the Phillips  relationship  and its changing  slope-is  discussed  below. 10 
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The resulting  t-statistics  are found to be highly significant,  with values 
generally  above  3. 
Equation  5.2 retains  the UGAP term without lags and introduces  a 
six-year  (to completion)  lag on prices.  The UGAP term exhibits  the in- 
creasing  coefficient  over time; the combined  coefficient  is 2.64 at the be- 
ginning  of the estimation  period  and 3.69 at the end (see table 6), and it 
is significant,  with t-values  that range  from 3.73 to 7.52. The coefficient 
on the  price  term  is close  to unity.  One  cannot  analyze  the  long-run  Phillips 
curve,  however,  without  access  to other  equations.  In any case,  comparing 
equations  5.1 and 5.2 makes clear that introducing  a lag on prices con- 
siderably  strengthens  the implied  feedback  or indirect  effect  in this single 
equation. 
Equation  5.3 omits the cross-product  UGAP  term but includes  lags 
on both UGAP  and pl.  This standard  Phillips  curve, defined  on UGAP 
with constant  coefficients,  is introduced  for purposes  of comparison,  so 
that the effect of adding  the UGAP  *  LT terms can be evaluated  more 
easily. 
Equation 5.4  includes the  various lags  and the  interaction term 
UGAP  *  LT.  The combined  coefficient  ranges  from  2.87 in 1954  to 4.41 in 
1975  (table 6). Several  interesting  results  appear  in this equation.  First, 
the ,j3  add  up to (a maximum  of) 4.41 after  three  years.  In equation  5.2, in 
which  the UGAP  terms  had no lags, the maximum  value  of the coefficient 
is 3.69. Hence, introducing  a lag adds only a small amount  to the direct 
effect  of UGAP  on wv,  but spreads  it out over  several  years.  The short-run 
responsiveness  of inflation  to unemployment  is greater  in equation 5.2 
than in 5.4. Also, the long-run  coefficient  on pl  falls below unity in 5.4 
(see table 5). The change  is, however,  scarcely  more than one standard 
error,  so little should  be made of this difference. 
Equation  5.5 is a recalculation  of 5.4 with  the reciprocal  of Perry  unem- 
ployment  replacing  UGAP.  The substitution  confirms  the basic results. 
The  increasing  slope  of the  Phillips  curve  again  appears,  with  the coefficient 
rising  from (approximately)  2 to 4 over the estimation  period (table 6). 
The  lagged  price  term  is back  to unity  and  the fit of the equation  is largely 
unchanged.  The  same  equation  was  also  run  using  unemployment  of prime- 
age males and its cross-product  term in place of Perry  unemployment. 
The  results  showed  the same  pattern  as that observed  for Perry  and UGAP 
unemployment,  so they are not reproduced  here. 
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Table 6.  Values of Combined  UGAP Coefficient,  Representative 
Equations  fronm  Table 5, 1954:1 and 1975:2 
Coefficient 
Beginning  End of 
of estimation  estimation 
Equation  period,  1954:1  period,  1975:2 
5.2  2.64  3.69 
5.3a  3.23  3.23 
5.4  2.87  4.41 
5.5  1.96  3.87 
5.7  1.38  3.09 
5.9  2.65  4.52 
Sources: Derived from combined UGAP coefficient, 2;pi +  2;-yiLT  (where UGAP is as defined in table 
5), and equations 5.2-5.5, 5.7, and 5.9 in table 5. 
a.  Since this equation omits the DyiLT term, the coefficient is unchanged from the  UGAP coefficient 
for equation 5.3 in table 5. 
effects. Equations  5.2  through 5.5 use a distributed  lag on past price 
changes  (the nonfarm  deflator),  currently  the most popular  method of 
capturing  these lagged effects.  The results of these structural  equations 
are  accelerationist  in tone (although  with  a very  long lag) as the coefficient 
on  p1 is close  to unity.  The  lag on  p1 is a fourth-degree  polynomial,  spread 
over twenty-four  quarters  and not constrained  to zero at either  end be- 
cause  such  a lag is best able  to capture  the possibility  that  the lag structure 
may well be greater  than twenty-four  quarters.  The mean  lag is approxi- 
mately  ten quarters  and varies  little across  these  equations. 
USE OF MONEY AS  A  LAGGED VARIABLE 
To establish  more directly  the role of excess demand  in the inertia- 
expectation  process,  the rate of change  in the money supply  lagged one 
period  (denoted  rm and representing  currency  plus demand  deposits)  is 
introduced  into the wage equation.  As is the case in the equations  in 
which  prices  are  the independent  variable,  the change  in the money  supply 
is entered  with a one-period  lag and with a twenty-four-quarter  Almon 
lag (fourth-degree  polynomial  with the lag unconstrained  at either  end). 
Comparing  the equations  5.6 and 5.7 with mhl  and those with  p1 indicates 
that the quasi-reduced-form  demand  approach  does as well as the auto- 
regressive  structural  equation  (using  price  inflation).  The  Rf2 and  individual 
parameter  fits are  largely  unchanged.  The coefficient  on mi7l  is, on average, 140  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
somewhat  lower  than the coefficient  on p1, but reasonably  simple  altera- 
tions in the structure  of the equation  can also bring  this coefficient  within 
a standard  error  of unity.2" 
The success  of replacing  p1 with mhI  is particularly  impressive  because 
the autoregressive  features  in p1 are likely  to improve  the fit of the equa- 
tion (without  necessarily  adding  any economic  explanatory  power).  Fur- 
thermore,  equations  containing  mhl  have strong  implications  for the role 
of aggregate  demand  in the wage-inflation  process.  The traditional  lagged 
price and wage measures  have often been interpreted  as reflecting  forces 
other than demand.  The money supply, on the other hand, is plainly a 
demand  variable. 
The  Phillips-curve  equations  containing  UGAP  and mhl  imply  a strongly 
neoclassical  view of the wage-inflation  process: a short disequilibrium 
effect,  related  to the size of UGAP,  and a longer-run  steady-state  influence 
from  growth  in the money  supply.  The  long lags in rhl-over  two years  to 
50 percent  adjustment-are  not unexpected  if one adopts  the kind  of argu- 
ment  relying  on institutional  rigidity  discussed  earlier. 
EFFECT OF CONTROLS 
Because  the period  after 1970  is of special  interest,  the role of the con- 
trols  program  established  by the Nixon administration  in 1971  is of some 
importance.  To the extent that the policy altered  the time path of wage 
inflation,  its exclusion  could bias the results, especially  since the time- 
varying  coefficient  on UGAP  is largest  in the past few years.  The problem 
with any controls  program  lies in quantifying  a variable  to measure  its 
impact.27  The best solution is to adopt an a priori  hypothesis.  My own 
view  is that the controls  had no long-run  effect.  Rather,  they slowed  wage 
inflation  during  Phases  I and II and then were  neutral  during  Phases  III 
and IV, but did not permit a wage catch-up.  At their termination,  the 
suppressed  wage inflation  was released,  and by 1975 the wage level was 
restored  to what it would have been had controls  not been implemented 
(with all other independent  variables  following  their actual time paths). 
26. The smaller  indirect  effect resulting  from the below-unity  coefficient  on m1l  may 
be related  to the issue of the appropriate  money-supply  measure  for inflation  equations. 
That problem  is beyond the scope of this paper. 
27. See Walter  Oi, "On Measuring  the Impact of Wage-Price  Controls: A Critical 
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This development  is built into the variable  NIXCON,  which appears  in 
equations  5.8 and  5.9.28 
The NIXCON  variable  does not change  the overall  results, and it is 
only  marginally  significant.  The  combined  coefficients  on the labor-market 
variables  are raised  somewhat,  comparing  equation  5.4 with 5.8, and 5.5 
with 5.9. To check  further  the meaning  that the controls  program  might 
have  for the validity  of the central  hypothesis  of an increasing  slope on the 
Phillips  curve,  equation  5.10 is estimated  ending  in 1971:2,  before  the im- 
plementation  of controls.  The negative  sign on UGAP  and the positive 
sign  on UGAP  *  LT  again  signify  an increasing  coefficient  over  time  for the 
combined  coefficient.  As in all the other equations,  the range  of the co- 
efficient  is positive  and statistically  significant  over the estimation  period. 
I attempted  to control  for "exogenous"  wage and price developments 
by allowing  the constant  to shift over time. In particular,  this maneuver 
was aimed  at capturing  developments  such as the increases  in oil prices 
in 1973-74.  These  equations  do not alter  any of the main conclusions  of 
this study,  and they are not reproduced  here.  Including  the wage or price 
change  in a specific  industry  to capture  "exogenous"  inflation  presents  a 
problem,  because  only  rarely  are  these  developments  genuinely  independent 
of demand  in an economy  as large  as the United States.  Including  them 
in the equation,  however,  dilutes  the impact  of the demand  variables  that 
are  likely  to be affecting  both  industry  and  aggregate  rates  of wage  change.29 
THE EXPECTATION  COEFFICIENT:  CHANGES OVER TIME 
It is difficult  to test for an upward  shift in the parameter  of the money- 
supply  variable  or price variable,  as well as the increasing  slope of the 
Phillips  relationship.  The two phenomena  are  probably,  though  not neces- 
28. I did not experiment  with specifications  for the NIXCON variables.  However, 
my a priori specification  did benefit from previous studies on the controls program. 
The relevant  issues and literature  are summarized  in Michael L. Wachter,  "The Wage 
Process:  An Analysis  of the Early 1970s,"  BPEA,  2:1974,  pp. 507-24. See also Robert  J. 
Gordon, "The Response of Wages and Prices to the First Two Years of Controls," 
BPEA,  3:1973, pp. 765-78. 
29. Furthermore,  there  must be some notion that the cost-push  pressures  from prob- 
lem sectors  are ongoing. For example,  whereas  the initial rise in oil prices  was due, at 
least in part, to broadened  monopoly power,  further  rises should not be labeled exoge- 
nous or cost-push  unless the relative  price  continues  to increase.  For a counterexample 
in which structural  problems  cause ongoing sectoral inflation,  see Susan M. Wachter, 
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sarily,  related.  In the model sketched  above, wage inflation  is ultimately 
due to excess-demand  pressures.  Short-run  labor-market  effects  are mea- 
sured  by UGAP.  Longer-run,  inertia  or expectation  factors  are captured 
either  by pl  or ml  1. One can interpret  these variables  as the far end of 
the excess-demand  lag. Hence,  an increasing  coefficient  on  p1 or 'mI  argues 
that the longer-term  effects  are becoming  more  important,  whereas  an in- 
creasing  coefficient  on UGAP  strengthens  the short-run  adjustment  of the 
Phillips  curve. 
The strategy  of including  time-varying  parameters  on both pl  (or rm  1) 
and UGAP  had mixed  results.  On the one hand,  the results  in most cases 
argued  for increasing  parameters  on both variables.  However,  the degree 
of multicollinearity  produced  lag structures  that  are  difficult  to interpret  in 
an economic  sense and incorrect  signs on some of the coefficients  over 
much  of the estimation  period. 
The  final  approach,  using  the 1954-75  data  period,  is to allow  the param- 
eters  to vary on mhl  and  p1 but not on UGAP.  Here again,  the inertia  or 
expectation  coefficient  shifts  upward.  An attempt  to ascertain  whether  in- 
cluding  a cross-product  on mhl  or p1 but not on UGAP  would do better 
than  the  reverse  specification  proved  futile;  one  specification  did  not clearly 
dominate  the other.  That  the coefficient  on  p1 has been  increasing  over  the 
postwar  period  comes as no surprise.  Gordon,  for example,  substituted  a 
nonlinear  price-expectations  term  that, given  the performance  of inflation 
over  the  past  decade,  is not dissimilar  to a time-trend  interaction  variable. 
Although  Gordon  did not deal  with  the issue  of increasing  responsiveness, 
his finding  that the coefficient  on p1 increases  with the rate of inflation  is 
relevant.  In this case,  the increased  responsiveness  arises  through  the feed- 
back effect  and suggests  a longer  mean lag as well as a larger  long-run 
value for the full coefficient.  Similar  results  can be obtained  by substi- 
tuting hl for  pl.8I 
As mentioned  above, whether  or not the coefficient  is increasing  on 
UGAP  or  pl (or mhl)  affects  the mean  length  of the response.  In all cases, 
30. Robert J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve," 
BPEA,  2:1972, pp. 404-06. Of course,  nonlinear  formation  of expectations  or any other 
scheme  that uses either  fixed  weights  or functional  forms  to allow coefficients  to vary is 
open to the rational-expectations  critique.  Presumably,  economic actors will eventually 
learn the systematic  component  of any policy strategy,  hence foiling future forecasting 
efforts.  My choice of a time-varying  coefficient  on UGAP  is designed  to test the hypoth- 
esis, suggested  by a number of observations  (mentioned  in the first section), that the 
coefficient  varied  more  or less monotonically  over  the postwar  period.  It does not suggest 
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the eventual  response  to aggregate  demand  is stronger.  In my equations, 
which stress  the increase  in the UGAP full coefficient,  it is the short-run 
response  that is strengthened. 
Viewing the Shift 
As discussed  earlier,  the regressions  in table 5 have a (time-varying) 
cross-product  term only on the UGAP or Up variable.  This forces the 
short-run  Phillips  curve  to shift outward  as it becomes  steeper.  To present 
a clearer  picture  of the change  between  the 1954 and the 1975 Phillips 
curves,  I have added a trend term to the constant in addition to the 
UGAP * LT term. This allows the Phillips  curve the latitude  to become 
steeper  without  shifting  outward,  or to contradict  the earlier  results  by 
shifting  outward  and  becoming  flatter.  The extra  trend  variable,  of course, 
increases  the collinearity  among  the independent  variables;  statistically,  it 
is difficult  to discriminate  among these various  hypotheses.  As a conse- 
quence  it should  not be surprising  that the shift in the slope was not sig- 
nificant  at traditional  levels of confidence  for some equations  (including 
those shown  below), although  it was for others.  Adding a shifting  trend 
term  to the constant  in equation  5.2 results  in wage  equations  for 1954  and 
1975,  respectively,  of the form 
(10a)  1954: iw =  -0.0809  +  2.0680 UGAP +  1.0073  pI; 
(0.25)  (1.04)  (7.64) 
(lOb)  1975: iw  =  -0.2963  +  4.0490 UGAP +  1.0073p1. 
(1.45)  (2.59)  (7.64) 
Making  the same  addition  to equation  5.5 yields 
(lla)  1954: iw =  0.1839 +  1.9148 Up-' +  1.0992pl; 
(0.55)  (1.10)  (7.88) 
(lIlb)  1975: iw =  0.2084 +  3.3997 Up-i  +  1.0992P1. 
(0.68)  (2.23)  (7.88) 
The short-run  Phillips  curves  derived  from these equations,  by setting 
pl  = 0, are shown in figures  2a and 2b, respectively.  The diagrammatic 
approach  helps to show the combined  impact on the wage equation  re- 
sulting  from the changing  size of the coefficients  on UGAP  (recorded  in 
table 6) and the constant  term,  and the increasing  level of UN. In a com- 
parison  of the curves  for 1954 and 1975, each at its respective  UN,  the 2 
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1975  curve  has a steeper  slope,  but by a smaller  margin  than that implied 
by table  6. Both  the decreasing  size  of the constant  term  and  the increasing 
coefficient  on UGAP  contribute  to a steepening  of the short-run  Phillips 
curve.  On the other  hand,  it is obvious  that at a given  low level of unem- 
ployment-say, 3 or 4 percent-the steepening  is dramatic.  Most impor- 
tant, the very steep  portion  of the nonlinear  Phillips  curve  is now in the 
unemployment  range  relevant  for policy. 
The labor-market  term with Perry-weighted  unemployment  (Up) is 
plotted  by assuming  a transformation  (suggested  by George Perry)  into 
U space of Up =  U -  U  +  Up, where the bars indicate average values of 
the rates  (calculated  separately  for the mid-1950s  and 1970s).  The Phillips 
curve  based  on Up  is also steeper  in 1975  than  in 1954.  In fact,  the increase 
in the slope over time is greater  in the Up than in the UGAP  equation. 
Here again,  the dilemma  posed by the nonlinearity  in Up (or UGAP)  is 
indicated.  A rise  of U of several  percentage  points  above UN  still  buys  only 
moderate  deceleration  of inflation;  while  for U lower  than UN,  unemploy- 
ment rates as high as 4 percent  now spur sharply  accelerating  rates of 
inflation. 
To illustrate  the message  of these equations  for the current  wage re- 
sponse  to UGAP,  I have  traced  through  a hypothetical  example  using  equa- 
tion 10b.  This  example  is meant  solely  to illustrate  the potential  impact  of 
changes  in unemployment  on inflation;  it is not a forecast  of a simulated 
wage  equation.  The numbers  in the example  assume  that the system  starts 
from  equilibrium,  free  of any  heritage  effects.  The  calculations  assume  that 
price  changes  follow wage  changes  with a unitary  coefficient  and with no 
lag. Although  this assumption  imparts  an upward  bias to the speed  of the 
wage response,  I offset  this effect somewhat  by ignoring  any direct  de- 
mand  effect  operating  through  the price  equation.  In terms  of equation  2, 
42  =  1 and  4)3 =  0. The  productivity  term  in the price  equation  is set equal 
to 2.8, which  yields  a stable  Phillips  curve  (that is, the rate of inflation  is 
stable when U =  UN). 
The results  are shown  in table  7. For example,  suppose  that U is main- 
tained  at 8 percent  with UN at 5.5. With  the 1975  UGAP  coefficients,  wage 
inflation  will decline  from its initial  rate by 1.7 percentage  points by the 
end of the first year, 2.1 points in two years (that is, an additional  0.4 
point  in the second  year),  and 2.4 points  in the third  year.  After  six years, 
the total response  will be approximately  4 points.  Even if the recession  is 
terminated  earlier,  the recession  values  for UGAP  will become  part of the 146  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Table  7. Hypothetical  Examples  Showing  Effect  of the Relation 
between  the Official  and  the Normalized  Unemployment  Rates 
on Wage  Acceleration  and  Deceleration,  1975a 
Change  in rate of wage inflation,  in percentage  points 
Value of 
official  and 
normalized  Year 
unemployment  Value of UGAP 
rates (percent)  coefficient  1  2  3  4 
Cumulative wage decleaation 
U =  8  0.17  -1.68  -2.05  -2.37  -2.73 
UN=  5.5 
U =  6.5  0.21  -0.85  -1.04  -1.20  -1.39 
UN  =  5.5 
Cumulative wage acceleration 
U=  4  0.34  1.91  2.34  2.69  3.11 
UN =  5.5 
U=  3  0.46  4.29  5.26  6.06  7.00 
UN =  5.5 
Source: Derived from text equation lOb. 
a.  Initial conditions are U  UN and wve =  Wt_,  followed by a once-and-for-all  change in the value of 
UGAP as indicated, where the symbols are as defined in tables 1 and 4. 
heritage  in pl,  causing downward  pressure  on wage inflation  into the 
future.3'  These longer-run heritage effects are especially important because 
the lag structure on p1 (or mhl)  is very flat. This, in turn, implies an espe- 
cially long adjustment process between wv  and UGAP. 
These calculations are based on the unlikely assumption that the coeffi- 
cients of the wage equation remain unchanged over the period of high 
unemployment. If the increasing "inflationary  bias" of the wage equation 
is due  to the heritage  of tightening  labor  markets  over  the postwar  period, 
then persistently  weak labor markets  should  yield some additional  defla- 
tionary  gains  by altering  the coefficients  favorably. 
31. Comparable  calculations cannot easily be performed  for the  1954 equation. 
Making  them would require  either  setting the rate of productivity  growth  below 2 per- 
cent or assuming  that the true  noninflationary  unemployment  rate in 1954  was approxi- 
mately 3 percent.  My UN  estimate  for 1954 is, on the other hand, close to 4 percent. 
If one redefines  UGAP  as c(UN!U),  where UN  is the 3 percent  figure  discussed  above, 
then a recession  comparable  to the 1975  experience  (with UGAP = 0.17) would require 
U =  4.41. In this case, the wage deceleration  would be -0.86  after one year, -1.05 
after  two years, -1.21  after three  years,  and -1.40  after four years.  As stressed  above, 
however,  the inflationary  dynamics  of the system depend on the full set of equations 
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Whereas  these  equations  illustrate  a slow, but persistent,  moderation  in 
wage inflation  as a consequence  of recession,  the response  to tight labor 
markets  is quite  different.  Suppose  that U is driven  down  to 4 percent  while 
UN  remains  at 5.5 percent.  As a consequence  of the nonlinearity  of the 
Phillips  curve,  the inflationary  response  is greater  even though  the hypo- 
thetical  expansion  gap is only 1.5 against  2.5 in the contraction  example. 
Again on the basis  of equation  5.2, wage  inflation  will be 1.91  percentage 
points higher  in the first year and 2.69 points higher after three years 
(table  7). And, as mentioned  above, even if the economy  is cooled off so 
that U =  UN, the period of U< UN will become part of the heritage and 
continue  to lend impetus  to wage  inflation.  If U is forced  down to about 
3 percent  with UN  at 5.5 percent,  the first-year  response  alone will raise 
the rate of wage inflation  by 4.3 percentage  points; after four years the 
wage  acceleration  will  be 7.0 percentage  points.  Hence,  the wage  equations 
estimated  in table 5 indicate  that unemployment  rates similar  to those 
observed  during  the late 1960s  would  cause  a sharp  acceleration  in the rate 
of inflation. 
The major  finding  of these  regressions  is that  the unemployment  terms, 
including  their  lagged  effects,  have  an increasing  coefficient  over  the  period. 
In addition,  both short-  and intermediate-run  Phillips  curves  (limited  by 
the truncated  unemployment  series)  have become steeper.  This result is 
strikingly  robust  across  the myriad  forms  of the wage  equation,  and holds 
whether  the Phillips-curve  term  is defined  to be UGAP,  the unemployment 
rate for prime-age  males, or the Perry  weighted  index. One important 
caveat:  it is difficult  to distinguish  a shift in the Phillips-curve  parameter 
from  a shift  in the inertia  or expectation  parameter.  Both appear  to have 
been  increasing,  but this development  cannot  be asserted  with confidence. 
The variables  61 and Ph  1 are viewed  here as capturing  the long-lagged 
demand  influences  working  through  an inertia  or expectation  mechanism. 
In particular,  thepil term  is interpreted  as a kind  of distributed-lag  genera- 
tor of labor-market  effects.  Hence, the feedback  from UGAP  to wV  to p 
(through  the price  equation)  and then back to iv is an important  compo- 
nent of the effects  of aggregate-demand  policies  on the rate of wage  infla- 
tion. On the other hand, mhl,  entered  into the quasi-reduced-form  wage 
equation,  represents  a direct demand effect and replaces  the feedback 
mechanism.32 
32. This observation  does not bear on the question of whether  the money supply is 
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Wage  Behavior  over  the Business  Cycle 
In this section,  rather  than using a wage equation  estimated  over the 
1954-75  period,  I adopt a variant  of the business-cycle  methodology  de- 
veloped  by the National Bureau  of Economic  Research.  This procedure 
allows  a study of data disaggregated  more finely  and over a longer  time 
frame  and  permits  a direct  comparison  with  the results  previously  reported 
by the Council of Economic Advisers and by Cagan.33  These studies 
showed,  for wages and prices  respectively,  that the rate of deceleration 
around  peaks  has slowed  markedly  over the postwar  years. 
This analysis  suffers  from  a timing  problem:  not all of the factors  that 
determine  wage inflation  exert their maximum  inflationary  impact at a 
cyclical  peak or their minimum  effect at a trough. Of particular  impor- 
tance  is the influence  of inflationary  expectations  or inertia.  Given  the long 
lags, the maximum  impact  of either  p1 or mhl  on wage inflation  will gen- 
erally  occur  after cyclical  turning  points.  And, given the quantitative  sig- 
nificance  of these variables,  the resulting  predicted  wage series is likely 
also to trail  NBER cyclical  turns.34 
UGAP  CRITERION 
The influence  of lagged  excess-demand  factors  suggests  altering  the dat- 
ing of turning  points  in wage  inflation.  Specifically,  I date  slack  periods  in 
the labor market  from the time when U first rises above UN  until the 
time when  the two are again  equal.  This dividing  line is meant  to be sug- 
gestive  and not to imply that the shift in the relation of U and UN is 
unique  for changes  in wage  inflation.  Clearly,  the magnitude  of the changes 
this point, see Christopher  A. Sims, "Money, Income, and Causality,"  American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  vol. 62 (September  1972), pp. 540-52, and Robert J. Barro, "Unantici- 
pated Money Growth and Unemployment  in the United States" (University  of Roch- 
ester, 1975; processed). 
33. See table 2 above and Cagan,  "Hydra-Headed  Monster." 
34. Although the NBER methodology has many useful points, it has some well- 
known  faults  as well. A major  issue is that cycles differ  substantially  in severity,  making 
their distinctive  features difficult to measure without a multivariate  framework.  To 
compound  this problem,  in attempting  to analyze  rates  of deceleration  of wage inflation 
around  a peak, one is comparing  the downturn  relative  to the previous  expansion.  Even 
if all downturns  were the same (and, of course, they are not), the preceding  expansions 
could be quite different  from one another. Michael  L. Wachter  149 
in UGAP  and i1 or mhl  is more  central  than any single  dividing  line. For 
example,  lagged  inertia  or expectation  effects  may still be exerting  upward 
pressure  when  U moves  above  UN.  To measure  the magnitude  of the effects 
properly  requires  regression  analysis. 
Using  the UN  series  presented  in figure  1, this alternative  dating  scheme 
is shown  below,  along  with the NBER series,  in which  P and T stand for 
peak and trough,  respectively.  The two schemes  differ  significantly  in an- 
ticipating  downward  pressure  on wage  inflation. 
NBER  dating  U Q  UN dating 
PtoT  1948:4-1949:4  U>  UN  1949:1-1950:3 
TtoP  1949:4-1953:3  U<  UN  1950:4-1953:4 
P to T  1953:3-1954:3  U>  UN  1954:1-1955:2 
U--  UN  1955:3-1957:3 
Tto P  1954:3-1957:3 
P toT  1957:3-1958:2  U>  UN  1957:4-1965:1 
T to P  1958:2-1960:2 
P to T  1960:2-1961:1 
T to P  1961:1-1969:4  U <  UN  1965:2-1970:3 
PtoT  1969:4-1970:4  U>  UN  1970:4-1972:3 
TtoP  1970:4-1973:4  U<  UN  1972:4-1974:3 
P to T  1973:4-1975:2  U>  UN  1974:4- 
DISAGGREGATED WAGE BEHAVIOR:  AFTER WORLD  WAR  II 
Table 8 presents  the rate of wage change  in high-, medium-,  and low- 
wage  industries  for periods  delineated  by the UGAP  criterion.  The entries 
are  all annualized  rates  of wage  inflation  dating  from  the beginning  of the 
tight  or slack  period.  Table  9 indicates  rates  of change  the year  before  and 
the year after U crosses UN.  The data strongly  support the use of the 
excess-demand  or UGAP  criterion  for dating  reversals  in wage pressure. 
As shown  in table 9, the UGAP  criterion  only twice  misses  the change- 
over  in the rate  of wage  inflation  over  the postwar  years.  One  miss,  more- 
over,  occurs  in the  midst  of wage-price  controls  in 1972,  making  its  meaning 
uncertain.  The second  occurs  in 1970:3  when  wv  in the high-  and medium- 
wage  sectors  continues  to rise  even  though  the economy  has switched  from 
a U below UN  to U above UN;  the low-wage  sector  has decelerating  wage 
inflation  as expected.  (Indeed,  the low-wage  sector  is on target  even  during 
the turning  point influenced  by 1972  controls.)  It should  be noted, how- 150  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Table  8. Rates  of Wage  Change  in High-,  Medium-,  and  Low-Wage 
Industries,  Cyclical  Periods  Based  on UGAP Criterion,a  1949-74 
Annualized  four-quarter  rate of change  in percent 
Type  of industryb 
Period  High-wage  Medium-wage  Low-wage 
1949:1-1950:1  1.29  3.55  1.85 
-1950:3  2.61  4.60  3.12 
1950:3-1951:3  9.17  7.52  7.21 
-1952:3  7.54  6.50  5.50 
-1953:3  7.98  6.42  4.88 
-1953:4  7.48  5.96  4.74 
1953:4-1954:4  2.58  3.38  1.01 
-1955:2  2.67  3.82  1.49 
1955:2-1956:2  6.19  5.33  6.08 
-1957:2  5.67  5.12  4.71 
-1957:3  6.10  5.12  4.36 
1957:3-1958:3  4.21  3.73  2.05 
-1959:3  4.18  3.63  2.53 
-1960:3  3.77  3.65  2.56 
-1961:3  3.64  3.49  2.45 
-1962:3  3.58  3.37  2.51 
-1963:3  3.48  3.27  2.49 
-1964:3  3.39  3.21  2.51 
-1965:2  3.32  3.19  2.55 
1965:2-1966:2  3.62  3.99  4.29 
-1967:2  3.75  4.01  4.75 
-1968:2  4.23  4.57  5.46 
-1969:2  4.69  4.96  5.50 
-1970:2  5.08  5.06  5.51 
-1970:3  5.30  5.08  5.51 
1970:3-1971:3  7.45  6.22  5.01 
-1972:2  7.22  6.52  5.24 
1972:2-1973:2  6.89  5.76  5.90 
-1974:2  7.45  6.68  6.71 
-1974:4  8.42  7.49  6.96 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment  and Earnintgs,  United States, 1909-72,  Bulletin 
1312-9 (1973), and relevant monthly issues of Employmenzt  and Earnings. 
a.  See text for discussion of UGAP criterion. 
b.  The three-digit standard industrial classification industries were divided equally, according to wage 
level in 1970, into high-, medium-, and low-wage categories. Because of the paucity of data on nonmanu- 
facturing industries available before 1958, the number of industries in the sample was increased at each 
turning  point. Consequently,  the early periods are based on many fewer observations than the later periods. 
The results would not have been significantly  altered if the initial group of industries available in 1948 had 
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Table 9.  Rates of Wage Change in High-, Medium-, and Low-Wage 
Industries,  Year before and Year after U Crosses UN, 1949-72 
Annualized  four-quarter  rate of change  in percent 
Turning  point 
Type  of industry 
Date of 
Type  changeover  Period  Highl-wage  Medium-wage  Low-wage 
Downturn  1949:1  Year before  6.23  8.41  6.69 
Year after  1.29  3.55  1.85 
Upturn  1950:3  Year before  4.06  4.86  5.23 
Year after  9.17  7.52  7.21 
Downturn  1953:4  Year before  5.90  5.31  3.07 
Year after  2.58  3.38  1.01 
Upturn  1955:2  Year before  3.93  3.82  1.92 
Year after  6.19  5.33  6.08 
Downturn  1957:3  Year before  5.59  4.85  2.79 
Year after  4.21  3.73  2.05 
Upturn  1965:2  Year before  3.36  2.94  3.51 
Year after  3.62  3.99  4.29 
Downturn  1970:3  Year before  7.01  5.86  5.67 
Year after  7.45  6.22  5.01 
Upturn  1972:2  Year before  7.42  7.58  4.89 
Year after  6.89  5.76  5.90 
Source: Same as table 8. 
ever, that this aberration occurred during by far the shallowest recession in 
the post-World War II years, as measured by UGAP. Furthermore, in the 
1970 downturn, relative to past recessions, employment fell only slightly in 
the high-wage sector and scarcely at all in the medium- and low-wage sec- 
tors. The unemployment data for 1970 look much worse than either em- 
ployment or  UGAP; that is, the upswing in unemployment was caused 
largely by an influx of young, relatively inexperienced workers, especially 
young female workers.35 
The disaggregated data of table 8 exhibit several other interesting fea- 
tures. A lagged wage response is especially noticeable in the high-wage 
sector, less so in the medium-wage sector, and hardly at all in the low-wage 
35. The minor  nature  of the downturn  in 1970  is also found  by analyzing  the weighted 
unemployment  series.  This was first  stressed  by Hall, "Process  of Inflation." 152  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
sector.36  As would  be expected,  this slower  pattern  of response  is especially 
visible  in the longer  periods  of slack or excess demand.  In these longer 
cycles,  the lagged  wage  response  (calculated  at an annualized  rate  from  the 
beginning  of the period)  is virtually  always  in the correct  direction,  even 
though  the speed  of adjustment  may be slow. This pattern  is particularly 
marked  in the high-wage  sector. Here, contractual  agreements  slow the 
response,  but  wages  under  new  agreements  are  influenced  by the  new  labor- 
market  conditions,  as well as by relative-wage  considerations.  The best 
evidence  of this is the slow but persistent  decline  in the annualized  wage 
change  in the high-wage  sector between  1957 and 1965 followed  by the 
slow but persistent  increase  between  1965  and 1970  (see table 8). One can 
conclude  that wage inflation  changes  direction  according  to the UGAP 
criterion  and then continues  to move in the direction  predicted  by the 
theory. 
On  the other  hand,  an inspection  of tables  8 and  9 appears  to suggest  that 
the basic Cagan-CEA  point still holds, but to a smaller  extent  than sug- 
gested  in table  2: over  the postwar  period,  in the  first  year after U crosses 
UN,  the rate of wage deceleration  or acceleration  falls. A problem  with 
concentrating  on rates  of deceleration,  however,  is that this second  differ- 
ence is quite sensitive  to the duration  and magnitude  of the upturn  as 
well as of the downturn.  For example,  the 1950  expansion  was greatly  in- 
fluenced  by the anticipatory,  precontrols  wage explosion  of the Korean 
War,  while  the uptrend  of the late 1960s  was unique  in its duration. 
A very  different,  and, I believe,  a more accurate  picture  emerges  if one 
analyzes  rates  of inflation  for the first  year  of tight  and  slack  intervals.  Do- 
ing so is especially  useful  for the period  prior to 1970,  when the Phillips 
curve  was stable  within  a relatively  narrow  band.  (The  main  reason  Cagan 
looks at periods  of deceleration  is to correct  for expectational  shifts  in the 
Phillips  curve  over time.) According  to these results,  the most significant 
aspect  of the turning-point  data  before  the 1970  recession  is the tendency 
of wages  to rise  less rapidly  in initial  years  of successive  tight  periods.  For 
example,  in the low-wage  sector,  the rates  of wage  change  in the first  year 
of the slack  periods  starting  in 1949, 1953,  and 1957  are 1.85, 1.01, and 
2.05  percent,  respectively,  thus  showing  no clear  pattern  over  time.  For the 
subsequent  tight periods,  however,  the wage  inflation  rates  are 7.21, 6.08, 
and  4.29 percent,  each  less than  its predecessor.  A similar  pattern  appears 
36. For further  evidence,  see Michael  L. Wachter,  "Cyclical  Variation  in the Inter- 
industry  Wage  Structure,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 60 (March  1970),  pp. 75-84. Michael  L. Wachter  153 
in the medium-wage sector. The decline in the rate of deceleration during 
the 1960s and early 1970s is thus due largely to the smaller  first-year up- 
ward response of wages to tight market conditions.  This is contrary to the 
view that the stickiness of inflation during this period resulted from a 
declining downward response of inflation rates to loose labor markets. In 
terms of the results of the preceding section, this can be explained by the 
dominance of years of slack labor markets relative to years of tight ones 
(operating in a framework with long distributed lags). 
BEFORE WORLD  WAR  II 
Although a comparison of the swings after World War II with earlier 
cycles would be valuable, it  would be  hazardous because of  a lack  of 
reliable data for some years of the prewar period and of any data at all 
for  others. The little information available on  the broadly based wage 
aggregates offers mixed  evidence  on  whether, measured from  peak  to 
trough, wages were more responsive to unemployment before 1948 than 
they were in the 1948-49 and 1953-54 recessions. Problems of comparison 
arise because, with only annual data available, an important part of the 
cyclical adjustment may be averaged out of the results. In addition, only 
measured  unemployment is available and even that is not a "hard" statistic 
relative to the kind of unemployment data available today. 
In the mild inventory recessions of 1923-24 and 1926-28, the unemploy- 
ment rate rose about 2.5 percentage points and the rate of wage decelera- 
tion was approximately 7 percentage points and 1, respectively (see table 
10). Except for 1919-21, even the more severe prewar recessions caused a 
drop in wv  only slightly greater than the drops of the early postwar cycles. 
In fact, the behavior of wage inflation during this period confirms the use- 
fulness of comparing periods of slack and tightness. For example, the busi- 
ness cycle peaked in January 1920, after a year in which the unemployment 
rate averaged 1.4 percent. The rate of wage inflation averaged 16 percent 
for 1920, however, up slightly from the year before. In 1921 and 1922, on 
the other hand, wages fell sharply-over  11 percent and 7 percent, respec- 
tively-even  though the trough of the cycle had been reached in July 1921. 
Hence, during this early period, even in sharp contractions wage inflation 
lagged business-cycle turning points, though in the 1919-21 contraction it 
ultimately responded dramatically. 
Finally, the evidence from the depresssion of the 1930s does not support Table  10. Rates  of Wage  Change  in Manufacturing,  Various  Series, 
Pre-World  War  II Unemployment  Cycles,  1902-38 
Annual  rate in percent 
Wage  series  and  coverage 
BLS 
Male 
Rees,  All 
Cyclea  all manu-  production  Semi-  All mann- 
and  period  facturingb  workers  Unskilled  skilled  facturing 
1902-04 
Year before peak 
to peak  6.92  ...  ... 
Peak to trough  1.32  ... 
1906-08 
Year before peak 
to  peak  8.24  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Peak to trough  -0.70  ... 
1913-15 
Year before peak 
to peak  1.95  ... 
Peak to trough  1.43  ...  ...  ...  .. 
1919-21 
Year before peak 
to peak  14.34  ...  ...  ... 
Peak to trough  1.97  ...  ...  ... 
1923-24 
Year before peak 
to peak  10.48  9.51  10.20  9.36  7.19 
Peak to trough  3.17  3.88  3.39  4.04  4.79 
1926-28 
Year before peak 
to peak  1.63  1.25  1.32  1.24  0.18 
Peak to trough  0.41  0.96  1.40  0.54  1.27 
1929-33 
Year before peak 
to peak  2.22  1.90  2.53  1.37  0.71 
Peak to trough  -4.66  -4.49  -4.69  -4.74  -5.99 
1937-38 
Year before peak 
to peak  15.23  12.28  13.77  12.77  12.23 
Peak to trough  0.41  3.02  2.81  3.22  0.48 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of  Economic Analysis. Lonig  Term Economic Growvth,  1860-1970 (Government 
Printing Office, 1973), Series B69 and B70; and U.S. Bureau of  the Census, Historical Statistics of  the 
United  States. Colonial  Times to 1957 (GPO, 1960), Series D 626, D  654, D 663, D  666. 
a.  Unemploymcnt cycles are defined by the peak and trough of the Lebergott unemployment-rate  series. 
See Long Termn  Economic Growth,  Series B1. 
b. Developed by Albert Rees. See ibid., p. 168. Michael L.  Wachter  155 
the notion  that  wages  were  more  flexible  in earlier  times.  Even  when  money 
wages  were  falling,  the average  annual  deceleration  in wages  (A;V)  was only 
6 percent  while  the unemployment  rate was rising  22.5 percentage  points 
over three  years.  Thereafter  to 1941,  wages  rose on average  while unem- 
ployment  remained  over 10 percent  (and generally  over 15 percent).  Be- 
tween 1929  and 1941,  the annualized  rate of wage  increase  for production 
workers  in manufacturing  was 2.72 percent.  Although  a detailed  analysis 
of the depression  is beyond  the scope of this paper,  there  is evidence  that 
government  measures  to spur  recovery  were  behind  the upward  movement 
in wages.  The  spurt  in the  early  1930s  is generally  attributed  to the  National 
Industrial  Recovery  Act, and the Wagner  Act and the subsequent  growth 
of unions  may  have  been  responsible  for that of the late 1930s.  Moreover, 
deducting  public-service  employment  from unemployment  would sig- 
nificantly  reduce  the implied  unemployment  rate, although  leaving  it far 
above  any likely  value of the noninflationary  rate at the time. 
Consequently,  the limited  data for the years  before  World  War  II pro- 
vide  little  evidence  of a significant  postwar  decline  in the responsiveness  of 
wages  to unemployment.  Indeed,  although  related  to government  policy, 
the tendency  of wages  to accelerate  over the last nine years  of the Great 
Depression  is the single  significant  deviation  from the central  hypothesis 
that wage  inflation  slows down (speeds  up) when U is greater  (less) than 
UN.37  Long-time  data series  reveal  clearly  that exogenous  shocks-in par- 
ticular,  wars,  controls,  and major  changes  in government  policies  such as 
the NRA and the Wagner  Act-bulk  large in determining  both sharp 
spikes  and less dramatic  changes  in wage  inflation. 
THE SLOW RESPONSE OF WAGE  INFLATION  AFTER 1957 
Although  the rate  of wage  inflation  moves  generally  in the direction  pre- 
dicted  by the UGAP  criterion,  it has not, since 1957,  moved  rapidly.  This 
slow response  is probably  the immediate  cause of the concern  that the 
Phillips  curve  is becoming  flatter. 
My explanation  for the recent  slow  response  of wage  inflation  is implicit 
in the regressions  of table  5. In the earlier  postwar  years,  the labor  market 
did not remain  tight for any lengthy  period; rather  it shifted  frequently 
37. Although  this finding  varies  from Cagan's  findings  for prices  before World War 
II, the two may not be contradictory.  All of the wage data in table 10 refer  to manufac- 
turing  wages.  Economy-wide  wages, which would have included  a relatively  large agri- 
cultural  sector,  might have been more responsive. 156  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
from  tightness  to slack.  In this type of environment,  inertia  or expectation 
effects  had little  time  to build,  and short-run  movements  in wage  inflation 
were dominated  by movements  along a given narrow  band of Phillips 
curves.  The  result,  reinforced  by the long lags onpi or mhl,  was a relatively 
flat series  of wage  increases.  With  the long period  of slack  after 1957  and 
the  long  tight  period  after  1965,  the  long  lags  on the  price  (or  money-supply) 
term  built  momentum  and hence  played a bigger  role in determining  the 
rate of wage  inflation.  As the equations  indicate,  the momentum,  or heri- 
tage, in the  p1 or mhl  terms  acts to override  cyclical  swings  in UGAP  and 
hence to weaken  the "observed"  cyclical  pattern  of wage inflation.  This 
effect is quite separate  from the impact of unemployment  on inflation. 
Figure  3, which  depicts  the UGAP  and  fil components  of wage inflation 
since 1954,  based on equation  5.2, illustrates  these arguments.  A similar 
picture  and conclusions  would follow if the decomposition  reflected  an 
equation  containing  mhl  in place of pl. 
The  figure  shows  that  in the cyclical  downturns  of 1954,  1957,  and 1960, 
the heritage  effects  of pl  and UGAP  moved in essentially  the same  direc- 
tion. At the time of the preceding  peak, no large  heritage  effects  of accel- 
erating  prices had built up, and thus the price variable  turned down 
promptly,  reinforcing  the short-run  impact  of unemployment.  The 1956-57 
experience  also benefited  from  the dissipation  of the effects  of the Korean 
War  price  explosion,  in terms  of the estimated  lag structures,  so that the 
price  variable  exerted  a major  downward  influence.  The effect  is to make 
wage  inflation  appear  sensitive  to cyclical  swings  in unemployment.  In the 
early 1960s,  aggregate-demand  policies  were  able to drive  unemployment 
down without any significant  increase  in inflation  because  the pl  effect 
continued  to fall, and U remained  above UN.  The final  three  years of the 
1960s  saw accelerating  wage  inflation  as falling  unemployment  rates  were 
gradually  augmented  by a rising  p1 effect. 
The 1970  recession  broke  from  the pattern  of earlier  recessions  because 
of a buildup  of lagged  excess-demand  effects  in the price  term.  Although 
the UGAP  contribution  to wage inflation  fell precipitously,  the pI effect 
continued  to rise.  Whereas  in earlier  downturns  p1 aided  UGAP,  beginning 
in 1970  it fought  the UGAP  effects.  The 1972  plateau  in p1 implies,  how- 
ever, that if the recession  had continued  a little longer, or if U had not 
fallen  below UN, the price  effect  finally  would  have helped  to slow the in- 
flation  rate.  This same  pattern  has prevailed  in 1974-75.  Although  UGAP 
is, in a sense,  working  harder  than  ever  to slow the inflation,  the legacy  of 4- 
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nearly a decade in which U was typically less than UN, built into the lags 
in pl  (or mhl),  has prevented any significant downturn in wage inflation. 
According to this interpretation,  current  unemployment does work to slow 
inflation, but its efficacy depends upon the heritage of past excess demand 
that is built into the lag structures. 
Conclusion 
The major conclusion of this paper is that the magnitude of the impact 
of unemployment and aggregate demand on wage inflation has increased 
over the postwar period. This result is obtained largely from analyzing 
structural and reduced-form wage equations. It contradicts the popular 
view, espoused in the academic literature and financial press, that wages 
are becoming less sensitive to aggregate-demand  policies. 
The impression that wage inflation is less responsive to unemployment 
arises from two factors. First, as indicated in tables 1 and 4, wages are in 
fact less responsive to  measured unemployment; but they do not  show 
lessened sensitivity when a weighted unemployment series-for  example, 
UGAP-is  used as the demand variable. Official unemployment is not an 
accurate measure of labor-market tightness. Second, as shown in figure 3, 
in earlier recessions the UGAP and p1 effects reinforced one another, thus 
confirming the observed cyclical nature of wage inflation. In other words, 
downward  movements along a Phillips curve (as unemployment increased) 
were strengthened by downward shifts of the short-run Phillips curve. In 
the past two recessions, on the other hand, UGAP  effects have been at least 
partially offset by large inertia effects which have kept the contribution of 
the price term rising at least through the early stages of the downturn. 
Essentially, upward shifts of  the Phillips relationship, due to  lagged or 
catch-up effects, dampened the observed wage responsiveness to cyclical 
swings. 
The growing importance of inertia effects is due to the long period of 
generally  tight labor markets after the mid-1960s. The simultaneous rise in 
the inflation and the unemployment rates noted in  1969-70 is to be ex- 
pected under such circumstances-the  turn in wage-inflation rates lagging 
far behind the NBER  turning point.  Hence,  the current downturn, al- 
though slow in yielding its benefits, is likely to provide a period of falling 
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(or the money supply) can reduce the immediate short-run response of 
wage  inflation to  economic  downturns, the  short-run tradeoff has  not 
thereby been repealed. It is the changing coefficients  that are central to the 
real issue of the changing responsiveness of wage inflation and not simply 
the size of the inertia effects in p1 or ml. 
The evidence presented  in this paper indicates that the Phillips curve has, 
since 1954, become steeper as it has shifted outward. Although I have not 
explored the reasons in detail, an explanation is inherent in the model of 
wage stickiness presented in the second section.38  Essentially, the institu- 
tional arrangements  in U.S. product and labor markets were based on the 
assumption that the very low rates of inflation during the 1950s and early 
1960s would continue. This assumption is particularly relevant to  firms 
with union contracts, well-developed internal labor markets, or other sig- 
nificant contractual arrangements. As rates of wage inflation rose, firms 
and unions were forced to  alter their contracts to  take account of  the 
higher expected rate of inflation or to make up for past rates of inflation. 
More important, given the greater  uncertainty  about the permanence of the 
new inflation rates (with both upside and downside risks), the response has 
been an alteration in the very structure of the institutional arrangements 
to permit firms and unions to react more rapidly to  labor-market condi- 
tions. I suggest that it is this factor that accounts for the increasing respon- 
siveness of wage inflation to labor-market  tightness. 
38. Similar  conclusions  are reached  from a quite different  perspective  in Robert E. 
Lucas, Jr., "Some International  Evidence on Output-Inflation  Tradeoffs,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 63 (June 1973),  pp. 326-34. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Robert  E. Hall: This  paper  amply  repays  the concentrated  effort  required 
to figure  out what  is going on inside  it. It starts  from  the conflict  between 
modern  theories  of wage adjustment,  in which rising  uncertainty  about 
future  inflation  should  make  the wage  more responsive  to unemployment, 
and the popular  impression  that wages  are now virtually  immune  to the 
influence  of unemployment.  Wachter  demonstrates  that casual econo- 
metrics  seems  to support  the popular  view,  and then builds  a case, relying 
on a more  refined  study  of the data,  that the modern  theory  is in fact cor- 
rect.  Though  I confess  that  I was  predisposed  toward  Wachter's  view,  only 
a detailed  examination  of his evidence,  including  some  material  not covered 
in the paper,  convinced  me that  the empirical  case  is, in fact, fairly  strong. 
Wachter's  first criticism  of the casual evidence  is exactly  right, in my 
view.  He observes  that  the  diminishing  response  of wages  to unemployment 
has been more  than offset  by a growing  response  to inflationary  expecta- 
tions as captured  in lagged  prices.  The true impact  of unemployment  on 
wages  should  be measured  to include  both the direct  effects  and the in- 
direct  effect  operating  through  prices. 
The  next step  in the case  is the introduction  of a normalized  measure  of 
unemployment  in place of the official  unemployment  rate. Like George 
Perry's  pioneering  work, this adjustment  attempts  to eliminate  the shifts 
in unemployment  that  are  attributable  to changes  in the  composition  of the 
labor  force  rather  than  changes  in inflationary  pressures  in the labor  mar- 
ket.  In fact,  Wachter's  adjustment  goes  much  further  than  Perry's.  My own 
approach  to the same problem  (BPEA,  2:1974) is intermediate  between 
the two. The differences  can be iliustrated  by considering  the effect  on the 
various  adjusted  unemployment  rates  of an increase  in the number  of teen- 
agers  in the  labor  force  that  is accompanied  by no change  in the unemploy- 
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ment rate of any demographic  group:  the official  unemployment  rate  will 
rise.  Perry's  rate  wili  rise,  but  not as much,  because  he weights  teenagers  by 
their  earnings  instead  of giving  equal  weights  to all members  of the labor 
force. My unemployment  rate will remain  exactly  unchanged,  because  it 
is a fixed-weight  index  of the age-sex  groups.  The logic of my measure  is 
that conditions  in the labor  market  as a whole have not changed  if there 
is no change  in the unemployment  rates of any group. Wachter's  nor- 
malized  unemployment  rate  will actually  fall. He expects  a change  in the 
composition  of the  labor  force  to drive  the teenage  unemployment  rate  up; 
if this fails  to happen,  he diagnoses  a tightening  of the labor  market.  Em- 
pirical  evidence  on the choice  of adjusted  unemployment  rates  is extremely 
weak.  In Wachter's  table  5, Perry's  unemployment  rate, Up,  actually  comes 
out ahead,  though  unreported  results  obtained  by Wachter  favor  his own 
measure.  But the data  won't give a definitive  answer. 
Wachter's  choice  of an unemployment  variable  has an important  role in 
his case  against  the  flattening  Phillips  curve.  His UGAP variable  is defined 
so that the impact  of a one-point  increase  in the unemployment  rate has 
a smaller  effect  on wage  inflation  when  UN  and U are  both  high  for compo- 
sitional  reasons  than  when  they  are  both  low, even  though  UGAP  itself  has 
the same  value.  The  flattening  of the Philips curve  on this account  is espe- 
cially  important  in Wachter's  work  precisely  because  his demographic  shift 
is so large. 
The centerpiece  of Wachter's  case is his set of estimates  of a Philips 
curve  with all variables  measured  to his satisfaction,  but including  a term 
that  lets the curve  shift  over  time.  If the popular  view  is correct,  he argues, 
then the shift should flatten the curve. Instead,  the curve steepens.  As 
Robert  Solow pointed  out, however,  most of Wachter's  evidence  on this 
point  is dubious  because  the  main  impact  of the shift  is to move  the  Phillips 
curve  upward  rather  than  to change  its slope.  This  problem  would  arise  no 
matter  how the time variable  were defined,  but Wachter's  LT variable 
makes  it particularly  serious  because  it varies  so little over  the sample  pe- 
riod  (from  4.92  to 5.40).  As Wachter  observes  in the section  entitled  "View- 
ing the Shift,"  the appropriate  solution  to this problem  is to let LT shift 
the intercept  as well as the slope of the Philips curve.  Then  the t-statistic 
associated  with  the slope-time  trend  interaction,  LT. UGAP,  provides  a test 
of the hypothesis  that the Phillips  curve  has steepened  against  the alter- 
native  that  it has become  flatter.  Wachter  does not report  the regression  in 
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chance  in four that the t-statistic  will be this size or larger  if the true co- 
efficient  is zero  and  there  is no actual  shift.  However,  in another  regression 
that has no role in the paper,  Wachter  found  a t-statistic  of over  2, enough 
to clinch the case. On the whole,  the evidence  is less than overwhelming, 
but this is always  true  with  the Phillips  curve. 
The recent  behavior  of wages  adds  independent  confirmation  of Wach- 
ter's  hypothesis  that  the Phillips  curve  is alive  and  well.  During  the present 
recession,  wage inflation  has fallen  from its peak of nearly 12 percent  in 
mid-1974  to around  6 percent  in late 1975  and early 1976.  Since  this drop 
exceeds  the prediction  of almost  any modern  Phillips  curve,  even a mild 
resurgence  of wage  inflation  would  be compatible  with  Wachter's  hypothe- 
sis. The current  low repute  of the Phillips  curve  does not survive  a careful 
study  of the actual  behavior  of wages. 
Charles  C. Holt: Michael  Wachter  has done a very  good piece  of research 
on a topic of great  importance  to national  economic  policy. Because  his 
paper  is long and  complex,  it might  be useful  to summarize  its basic  thrust. 
Wachter  takes  the unemployment  rate  of the  largest  and  most stable  group 
in the labor  force,  prime-age  males,  25 to 54 years  of age, as an index  of 
labor-market  tightness  that  is relevant  for measuring  inflationary  pressures 
on money  wages.  Unemployment  at a rate  of 2.9 percent  for this group  is 
assumed  to be noninflationary,  and Wachter  wants  to estimate  what the 
corresponding  normalized  national  unemployment  rate  would  be now that 
youth and women  constitute  increasingly  large components  of the labor 
force.  Wachter  takes  into account  the higher  unemployment  rates  of youth 
and women,  their  increased  numbers  in the labor force, and the effect  of 
the relative  increase  of youthful  workers,  aged 16 to 24, in raising  still 
further  their  unemployment  rates.  His estimate  of the normalized  unem- 
ployment  rate, UN, increases  steadily  from 1955  to 1975  (see his figure  1). 
When  Wachter  uses the ratio  of UN to the national  unemployment  rate 
in regression  estimates  of Phillips  curves,  he finds  a gradual  strengthening 
of the direct  and  indirect  effects  of unemployment  on the inflation  rate  (see 
the last columns  of tables  4 and 6). Without  adequate  program  responses 
to facilitate  structural  adjustments,  the demographic  changes  in the labor 
market  have  raised  the noninflationary  unemployment  rate  from  4 percent 
in 1955  (a number  I would consider  already  excessive)  to 5.5 percent  in 
1975. 
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participation  of women  will offset for some time the declining  entry of 
young  workers.  Given  such  a trend,  this  research  implies  that  employment- 
guarantee  programs,  public-service  employment,  or other  programs  for re- 
ducing  unemployment  that  are  primarily  demand-oriented  cannot  succeed 
in four  years  in making  noninflationary  an unemployment  rate  of 3 percent, 
even  for adults,  without  substantial  changes  in the scope  and effectiveness 
of structural  programs  and  policies  in labor  and  product  markets.  Thus,  in 
my view, Wachter's  research  has important  implications  for improving 
the regulation  of aggregate  demand  and demonstrating  the need for new 
structural  policies  in showing  the high costs of excessive  fluctuations  of 
unemployment  in either  direction.  In addition  to showing  the need  for new 
manpower,  antitrust,  and other structural  policies, this work shows the 
relatively  low incremental  anti-inflation  impact  of high  unemployment  and 
the inflationary  risks of low unemployment  unless  structural  reforms  are 
instituted. 
Now for some technical  points: 
First,  the assumption  is made that if UPM  were constant,  inflationary 
pressure  would  be constant  even  in the face  of changing  demographic  com- 
position.  However,  greater  unemployment  of women  and  youths  will  have 
some  anti-inflationary  effect,  so UPM  would  have  to be lower  to hold infla- 
tionary  pressure  constant.  Wachter's  UN  gradually  drifts  too high, so the 
coefficient  on (UN! U) will gradually  drift  too low. Hence  Wachter  may be 
underestimating  the upward  trend  in that coefficient. 
Second,  there  is a great  deal  of confusion  among  both  the public  and  the 
profession  about  the Phillips  curve,  and I am afraid  that Wachter's  expo- 
sition  will  contribute  even  more.  He is clear  on the theory,  I think,  but his 
discussion  still  leaves  something  to be desired.  I do not agree  with  his view 
that  the distinction  between  direct  wage  effects  and indirect  price  effects  is 
merely  a matter  of definition.  Multicollinearity  makes  the theoretical  speci- 
fications  critical. 
Three  sets of relations  governing  wages,  prices,  and unemployment  are 
involved  in the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff.  Wachter  estimates  two 
relations  and  makes  assumptions  about  the third.  For the policy question 
that  he discusses,  a dynamic  tradeoff  relation  combining  all three  relations 
is needed. 
It is relevant  to talk about  a long-term tradeoff  or a short-term  tradeoff, 
and  they  will  be quite  different;  but these  two concepts  should  not be con- 
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more  treacherous  than  when  demand  variables  are  introduced.  The growth 
of the money  supply  is entered  in a wage  equation  while  it belongs  in the 
price  equation.  Because  the price  equation  isn't treated  explicitly,  there  is 
no convenient  way to bring  in commodity-price  effects. 
I am  pleading  for  more  stress  on thinking  in systems  and  structural  terms 
rather  than trying to cram many issues into a simple Phillips relation. 
Where  an overall  reduced-form  relation  between  inflation  and unemploy- 
ment  is presented,  then  dynamics,  and  exogenous  influences  such  as oil and 
worldwide  failure  of grain  crops,  should  be included.  Otherwise,  the pre- 
sentation  of a simplistic  and  utterly  inadequate  Phillips  relation  is confusing 
and subject  to glib attack  based on a two-dimensional  scatter  plot that 
purports  to demonstrate  that  there  is no relation  between  inflation  and  un- 
employment.  Sufficiently  misinterpreted,  such  an approach  can be used to 
discredit  the profession.  Wachter's  mathematical  theory  is fine, but some 
of the final  figures  are very  likely  to be misunderstood. 
General  Discussion 
The Wachter  paper proved to be particularly  provocative  in eliciting 
comment  from  the  panel.  The  author  was  commended  for  testing  the  widely 
accepted  proposition  that the Phillips  curve had grown  flatter  in recent 
years;  nobody  contested  his conclusion  that  this  piece  of conventional  wis- 
dom did not stand  up well. While  these  negative  findings  were  seen as im- 
portant,  the positive  results  that  Wachter  reported  on the steepening  of the 
Phillips  curve  were  viewed  skeptically  by many  participants. 
Robert Solow pointed out a particular  feature  of those equations  re- 
ported  in table 5 in which  the unemployment  variable  interacts  with  time. 
The specification  of those equations  forces  the curve  to become  steeper  if 
it shifts  up through  time;  it can  only  become  flatter  if it shifts  down  through 
time.  Such  a regression  formulation  gives  the curve  no opportunity  to pivot 
around  some  point  in the  middle  of the range.  That  option  arises  only  when 
the intercept,  as well as the slope, is permitted  to change  through  time, as 
in the equations  10 and 11 reported  by Wachter.  But the statistical  results 
of those equations  do not provide  solid evidence  of steepening. 
Robert  J. Gordon  doubted  that the model could accurately  distinguish 
between  (1) the shift of the normalized  unemployment  rate, and (2) the 
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term,  since  the two have occurred  more  or less simultaneously.  John Sho- 
ven  was  disturbed  by the sizable  quantitative  difference  between  the results 
obtained  with Wachter's  UGAP  measure  and with Perry-weighted  unem- 
ployment,  as reflected  in figure  2. Edward  Gramlich  expressed  his reserva- 
tions about the formulation  in that figure,  which ignored  the feedback 
effect  of prices.  He preferred  findings  that did allow for price feedback, 
such as those summarized  in table 7. R. J. Gordon shared  this concern, 
guessing  that one would  get statistically  indistinguishable  results  with  lags 
of varying  length  applied  to prices  and  to unemployment.  Michael  Wachter 
responded  that,  in some  fundamental  sense,  the  true  reduced-form  equation 
should contain infinite  lags on the unemployment  variable  which keep 
influencing  the history  of prices;  to him, the decision  on where  the lag on 
the labor-market  variable  ended  and the price  term  began  is an arbitrary 
one. Arthur  Okun  suggested  that the bouquet  of equations  presented  in 
table  5 might  be viewed  by readers  as a demonstration  that the interaction 
term  has a positive  coefficient  regardless  of the choice of lags, the unem- 
ployment  variable,  or other  aspects  of the specification. 
George  Perry  emphasized  that, according  to Wachter's  equations,  the 
world  had  become  much  more  inflationary  at any unemployment  rate  and 
even  at any normalized  unemployment  rate.  If price  stability  is consistent 
with wage increases  of roughly  3 percent,  Wachter's  equation 5.4, for 
example,  implied  that noninflationary  wage behavior  would have been 
obtained  with  an unemployment  rate of less than 31/2  percent  in the mid- 
fifties  and  would  currently  require  an unemployment  rate  as high as 7 per- 
cent. In contrast,  equations  10 and 11 suggest  that the noninflationary 
unemployment  rate  in 1975  was  about  51/2  percent,  agreeing  with  Wachter's 
estimate  of UN.  But they imply implausibly  that an unemployment  rate 
of only 21/2  percent was noninflationary in 1954. 
Only  a small  portion  of those  shifts  could  be accounted  for by the demo- 
graphic  Shift  that  affected  the normalized  unemployment  rate;  the rest  had 
to reflect  some different  force which  is not explained  in the paper.  Thus, 
to Perry,  the issue  of steepening  or flattening  was  secondary.  The  big ques- 
tion was, "What  else has been affecting  the economy  to make it so much 
more prone  to inflation?"  Expanding  on Perry's  comment,  James  Tobin 
pointed  out that  the normalization  of the prime-age  unemployment  rate  to 
2.9 percent  did not really  constrain  the labor  market  to the same  degree  of 
inflationary  behavior  at that rate through  time. Tobin suggested  that an 
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for  prime-age  males  was  consistent  throughout  the period  with  nonacceler- 
ating  inflation;  and  that  specification  could  be tested  to see whether  or not 
the curve  twisted. 
R. J. Gordon  suggested  that a plausible  explanation  for a large  upward 
shift in the Phillips  curve could be built on the assumption  that wage 
changes  have  become  much  more  responsive  to price  changes  because  peo- 
ple pay more  attention  to price  changes  in an inflationary  world.  Charles 
Holt found  Gordon's  conjecture  quite  plausible;  the experience  of inflation 
might  have  made  people  quicker  on the draw,  so to speak,  in terms  of ad- 
justing  wages  to price  changes.  However,  any  greater  responsiveness  in the 
upward  direction  would steepen  Wachter's  equations  symmetrically,  im- 
plying  more  responsiveness  in the downward  direction  as well. In reality, 
there  were  good reasons  to suspect  that an asymmetry  existed. 
The policy implications  of the findings  drew comment  from Marina 
Whitman  and Shoven.  Whitman  noted that a steeper  Phillips  curve ap- 
peared  to imply  that the inflation  problem  was more easily corrected  by 
use of restrictive  stabilization  policy.  But  when  the  instability  of the  Phillips 
curve  as well as its slope was taken into account,  she doubted  that one 
could  draw  any  comfort  for  policy  from  the steepening  of the  curve.  Shoven 
suggested  that  the results  in table  7 pointed  to an extremely  high  social  cost 
of wage  deceleration.  A deceleration  of 2.7 percentage  points  in the rate  of 
wage  inflation  required  maintaining  an 8 percent  unemployment  rate for 
four years.  That represents  a cumulative  total of 10 percentage  points of 
annual  unemployment  above  the normalized  rate  and  a total cost of nearly 
$500  billion,  or close to one-third  a year's  GNP. 
Wachter  responded  to a number  of the criticisms  and comments.  He 
was  in general  agreement  with  the comments  by Hall and  Holt. He agreed 
with  Holt's suggestion  that a full-model  approach  should  shed  more light 
on the problem  than a single-equation  estimation,  although  he defended 
the inclusion  of the money-supply  variable  in the reduced-form  approach. 
Wachter  also pointed  out that his attempts  to represent  exogenous  events, 
such  as changes  in oil and  food  prices,  with  dummy  variables  did  not change 
the outcome  of the regressions.  He argued  that some of the disagreement 
in the general  discussion  was over the interpretation  of the lagged  price 
term,  and he tried to persuade  the panel that that term should  be inter- 
preted  as a distributed-lag  generator  of past labor-market  conditions.  In 
this light, R. J. Gordon's  comment  that the increasing  responsiveness  is 
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Although  Wachter  agreed  that  long recessions  had  large  economic  costs, 
and was not recommending  them as a policy, he pointed out that any 
calculations  based  on the old notions  of a 4 percent  full-employment  un- 
employment  rate would overstate  the costs of unemployment.  In any 
case, his estimates  of the cost of reducing  inflation,  though  still large,  are 
lower  than  the consensus  figures. 
Wachter  agreed  with Perry  and Solow that it is difficult  to distinguish 
between  the effect  of changes  in the intercept  and in the slope of his equa- 
tions.  Wachter  felt that other  factors  besides  those  directly  in the equation 
could be making  the economy  more inflation-prone.  But, in looking for 
causes,  he would  tend to focus on other  aggregate-demand  factors  such as 
capacity  utilization,  excess demand  in agriculture,  and the growing  syn- 
chronization  of the business  cycle  throughout  the world. 